Afghanistan

[Atehequa]

Osama Bin Laden is supposedly dead, so why are there still U.S. troops in Afghanistan ?

Is it because American leaders do not want to admit defeat in a land that so many other would be conquerors have failed to conquer ?

So what does the U.S. really want there, vast mineral resources ?

[stilltrucking]

Hitler is dead too, why are there troops in Germany?

[Atehequa]

Hitler is dead too, why are there troops in Germany?

Those troops in Germany are not getting blown to bits or shot to pieces.

But I guess the American Empire can do whatever it damn well pleases and to object is unpatriotic, eh ?

Hail Caesar

[tinkerjack]

kurt vonnegut wrote:
"I know. I know, I know."

Somewhere around 1,000 military bases around the globe. Don't tread on the "United Snakes of America" ™

[Atehequa]

kurt vonnegut wrote:
"I know. I know, I know."

Somewhere around 1,000 military bases around the globe. Don't tread on the "United Snakes of America" ™

Oh how we know, especially in a land with no snake charmers or mongooses.

No kingdom or empire has ever completely conquered or controlled all the hill tribes of Afghanistan.

[mnaz]

well, the official line has always been that we must "defeat the taliban," so that they can't return and "set up shop for more global terrorism." but what does that mean? we have to kill them all? and if not, where do they go? and what kind of mega-corrupt, godawful puppet government are we propping up in the meantime?

yes, the extremely versatile, shape-shifting "global war on terror" is the official line.

from research i did late last year ....

-----------------(re-post)--------------------

for those folks who continue to see winning in afghanistan as vital to our security... are the taliban connected to al qaeda's (apparent) global aims? information has surfaced in recent years that seems to refute this basic assumption, such as this article from i.p.s., e.g. (2/11/10):

http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=50300

WASHINGTON, Feb 11, 2010 (IPS) - Evidence now available from various sources, including recently declassified U.S. State Department documents, shows that the Taliban regime led by Mullah Mohammad Omar imposed strict isolation on Osama bin Laden after 1998 to prevent him from carrying out any plots against the United States. The evidence contradicts the claims by top officials of the Barack Obama administration that Mullah Omar was complicit in Osama bin Laden's involvement in the al Qaeda plot to carry out the terrorist attacks in the United States on Sep. 11, 2001. It also bolsters the credibility of Taliban statements in recent months asserting that it has no interest in al Qaeda's global jihadist aims.

in 2009, no clear consensus over the taliban's threat could be reached during the debate on war escalation, even as the taliban made some inroads from the afghan border into pakistan's tribal areas, a trend that was obviously cause for concern, though it should be kept in perspective according to various accounts written then, such as this time article:

http://www.time.com/time/world/article/ ... 67,00.html

U.S. leaders began sounding the alarm last week when the militants, buoyed by a peace agreement that put them into effective control of the Swat Valley, extended their reach...

The (Pakistani) generals don't share Clinton's view of the Taliban as some sort of external force invading territory the Pakistani military is obliged to protect; on the contrary, odious though it may be to the country's established political class and to the urban population that lives in the 21st century, the movement appears to be rooted in Pakistan's social fabric. The Taliban's recent advances have been accomplished in no small part through recruiting locals to its cause by exploiting long-standing resentment toward the venal local judicial and administrative authorities that prop up a feudal social order.

What's more, if the Taliban's goal were to seize state power rather than local control, it would have little hope of doing so. The insurgency is largely confined to ethnic Pashtuns, who comprise little more than 15% of the population. It is unlikely to find significant resonance in the major cities such as Islamabad and Lahore . . . While the Taliban is reported to have made some inroads in southern Punjab and has linked up with small militant groups based in the province, it remains a minor presence in those parts of the country where the majority of Pakistanis live. Even in the most generous assessments of their fighting strength, they are very lightly armed and outnumbered by the army by a ratio of more than 50 to 1.

something else that you rarely hear discussed: is there evidence that the war, if anything, is accelerating pakistan's radicalization? the heavily-populated punjab area has seen a rise in militancy roughly corresponding with the latest military buildup. (although perhaps no irrefutable evidence exists to prove direct causality). from today, this article from the conservative (yes, conservative) weekly standard:

http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/new ... 53981.html

Rising militancy in Punjab poses a more serious threat to Pakistan's stability and American national security . . . It is against this backdrop that Western counterterrorism myopia becomes evident. For the past decade, the United States has focused its counterterrorism efforts in the region on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and surrounding tribal areas.

http://blogs.reuters.com/pakistan/2011/ ... -al-qaeda/
(Feb.7, 2011):

The Afghan Taliban would be ready to break with al Qaeda in order to reach a negotiated settlement to the Afghan war, and to ensure Afghanistan is not used as a base for international terrorism, according to a report by Kandahar-based researche rs Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn, released by New York University.

It says that the relationship between the Taliban and al Qaeda was strained both before and after the September 11 2001 attacks, partly because of their very different ideological roots. Al Qaeda grew out of militant Islamism in the Middle East, notably in Egypt, which — when fused with the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan — created its own view of global jihad. Taliban leaders grew up in rural southern Afghanistan, isolated from world events. Many were too young to play a big role in the Afghan jihad, and had no close ties to al Qaeda until after they took power in 1996. “Many Taliban leaders of the older generation are still potential partners for a negotiated settlement. They are not implacably opposed to the U.S. or West in general but to specific actions or policies in Afghanistan. These figures now understand the position of the international community much better than they did before 2001.

The NYU report argues, however, that military operations designed to fragment the Taliban may be making talks harder rather than easier by creating younger, more radicalised fighters less open to a peace deal. It says the U.S. policy of targeting mid-level commanders, along with arrests in Pakistan of senior leaders, is undercutting the old leadership and paving the way for a younger generation more open to al Qaeda. Indeed back in 2009, Taliban statements were already indicating evidence of a rift with al Qaeda. Some time when the history books are written, we will have to ask why that rift was not seized upon at the time, and indeed whether a negotiated settlement could have been achieved without the intensified fighting of 2010. . . “

and there is this analysis from one of the world's leading think tanks on security from last fall (guardian uk): "al qaeda and taliban threat is exaggerated..."

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/se ... fghanistan

According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the west's counter-insurgency strategy has "ballooned" out of proportion to the original aim of preventing al-Qaida from mounting terrorist attacks there, and must be replaced by a less ambitious but more sensible policy of "containment
and deterrence".

http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/al-qaeda-ta ... xus/p20838

Richard Barrett, Coordinator, UN Monitoring Team, al-Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee, UN Monitoring Team, al-Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee: If there is a money flow, it's from al-Qaeda to Taliban rather than Taliban to al-Qaeda, which is very interesting.The Afghan Taliban is a nationalist movement, and they repeatedly say that. When they look at what they've gained from their association with al-Qaeda, [it's] pretty much heavy on the negative than on the positive. They got kicked out in October 2001. Maybe if al-Qaeda hadn't attacked the United States in September 2001, they'd still be in Kabul. Now they're trying to get back. So although al-Qaeda leaders say, "Yes, Mullah Omar is our leader," operationally, it's not so strong. . . .if the Taliban were governing in Kabul, they wouldn't necessarily have al-Qaeda right behind them. Could they keep them out is the key question. In many parts of Afghanistan, particularly in Waziristan over the Durand Line, there's no way anyone's going to keep anybody out. There are hundreds of crossing points; there are villages which straddle the line. But maybe they would try. . . . I think personally that al-Qaeda is much more comfortable and better off, and far better established now, on Pakistan's side of the border.

Nigel Inkster, Director of Transnational Threats and Political Risk, International Institute for Strategic Studies; former Director for Operations and Intelligence, British Secret Intelligence Service, International Institute for Strategic Studies: . . .continuing pressure by [the] International Assistance Security Force in Afghanistan and the current campaign by Pakistan against their Taliban problem--has created a situation in which the jihadist forces have come together to perhaps a greater extent than they might otherwise have done through a perception of a common threat. If it came to be that the Taliban [was] able to recover all or part of Afghanistan, I think it improbable that [its] first act would be to invite al-Qaeda back in, not least because that would of course bring with it the obvious risk that [it] would continue to be the subject of U.S. and NATO attacks. So I don't think [the leadership] wants that. But they might not be able to prevent it. If you were to ask what al-Qaeda's leadership would like to do, the answer is they would like to get back to Afghanistan if they could.

....things to consider.

okay. now if one wants to argue that open-ended, costly large-scale war and occupation are justified for other possible reasons, such as, perhaps, general principles of justice and freedom, then fine, make that case. but is it still legitimate to keep sounding this apocalyptic world security alarm? that seems increasingly specious to me. are we doing almost as much (or more) harm as good in escalating this war? furthermore, is the war ultimately "winnable?" and what exactly will be "won?" and is it sustainable without prolonged major military occupation? didn't we already "win" this conflict once, some 9 years ago? let's look at what kind of a regime our blood and treasure is buying:

here are some articles on karzai's disaster of a regime:

from 8/23/10: http://www.examiner.com/afghanistan-hea ... zai-regime

How bad is the corruption? It is so pervasive that a majority of Afghans would welcome the return of the Taliban’s Islamic fascism if the only other alternative is continuing to live under the illegitimate Karzai regime’s reprobate incompetence and mob-like rule.

Authorities want to eliminate a surreal arrangement that allows government officials and other well-connected figures to board planes carrying suitcases packed with cash without declaring the transfers or being searched. A senior U.S. official said that serial numbers on U.S. currency were used to nail Afghanistan's former minister of Islamic affairs this year, who has been accused of extorting millions from companies seeking contracts.

On Jan. 14 a U.S.-trained special task force raided the headquarters of money transfer company New Ansari Exchange and discovered that New Ansari was helping to launder profits from the illicit opium trade and moved Taliban money that had been earned through extortion and drug trafficking. The crime unit also found links between the money transfers and some of the most powerful political and business figures in the country, including relatives of Mr. Karzai. Afghan customs documents reviewed by the Wall Street Journal indicate that $3.18 billion in cash was flown out of the country between January 2007 and February 2010... And this only includes declared amounts - the undeclared total is anybody's guess. Late last week Karzai directly intervened to win the quick release of senior aide Mohammad Zia Salehi... The latest story is that the corruption case against Salehi is wider than previously thought and Karzai wants to prevent Salehi from spilling his guts to investigators.

Hamid Karzai's brother, Ahmed Wali, has been implicated before for causing persons to " disappear," if you will. This is interesting because now Afghan corruption investigators say they fear for the safety of their families and do not believe it is possible to convict those close to the president.

wow. but at least afghan women are better off now, right? that is, aside from having to endure endless war. probably. they can attend school now. i certainly won't argue that conditions aren't better for women now, but to what degree? karzai's regime has unfortunately adopted many oppressive aspects of sharia law in regard to women, a few of them cited here (11/29/10):

http://revolutionaryfrontlines.wordpres ... -to-women/

The Karzai regime has adopted sharia-inspired laws related to marriage and the family that give men the right to prevent their wives from leaving the house. It is illegal for a wife not to give in to her husband's sexual demands. The Karzai's government habit of freeing men imprisoned for committing gang rape is so notorious that it even provoked a protest by the United Nations. In an interview with the BBC Persian service, Sima Samar, now the head of the Independent Human Rights Commission of Afghanistan, declared, the government institutions are a serious obstacle to women's rights in Afghanistan.

so there you go. the empire always has its reasons ....

[stilltrucking]

So what does the U.S. really want there, vast mineral resources ?

No China got the mineral resources.

China and Afghanistan sign economic and security deals
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-19693005

We are just there because we love war. We are just in it for the feeling, the thrill of the kill. We smite the heathens, we are God's Christian soldiers.
God bless the United States of America and its wars.



Good copy mnaz, thanks for the links. I guess I know what happened to my peace dividend after we won the cold war. Yes we have always been at war with the Taliban, except during the cold war when they were on our side. So we were for them before we were against them,

We have always been at war with EastAsia

In the mean time lets all be beatniks and read James Joyce, drink, eat and be merry cause this is the way it has always been since my father's war, when pretty girls stood on street corners and gave white feathers to cowards who would not enlist to save the world for Democracy and the Wall Street banksters.

[short timer]

a factoid, we have very few veterans in washington dc, in congress. too many chicken hawks.

So now we have Bob (doh) Kerry the Ketchup guy being considered for sec of state, what is that equivalent to, consul, proconsul of the empire, wonderful, I sure hope he learned something from 2004— from Iraq.

I miss jimbo, I miss surfer mike, I miss Jim Turner

I would like to vote for Bob Kerrey as secretary of state

Joseph Robert "Bob" Kerrey (born August 27, 1943) was the 35th Governor of Nebraska from 1983 to 1987 and a United States Senator from Nebraska from 1989 to 2001. Before entering politics, he served in the Vietnam War as a naval officer and SEAL and was awarded the Medal of Honor (MOH) for heroism in combat. During the same action for which he was awarded the MOH, he was also severely wounded, precluding further naval service.

[mnaz]

i like a lot of what kerrey has to say. thanks for the links, jack.

well, while i'm at it, i might as well (re)post the big energy aspect of our afghanistan involvement. there's always some sort of big energy aspect to our conflicts, it seems . . . .

--------------(re-post)-----------------

many folks have pointed out possible (likely) "big energy" motivations for the afghan war, and some have suggested that, after all is said and done, they were the primary motivations. i'm not sure i can fully agree with that assessment, yet some disturbing documents are out there w.r.t. the oil and gas push.

as an aside, on another site someone argued that even if big energy concerns were the main motivation for war, it's a "moot point" if our intentions and the eventual results are good. but ultimately, is this true? on the heels of events in iraq, doesn't this go toward sustained erosion of credibility on top of the prolonged violence and destruction of long-term war and military occupation? and this does no deeper, longer-term damage? counts for nothing?

http://original.antiwar.com/bock/2009/0 ... about-oil/

I'm not exaggerating or caricaturing too much when I suggest that the usual "it's all about oil" argument goes something like this. To get that pipeline built, it was/is necessary to invade, quash the unfriendly/uncooperative elements, and install a puppet government willing to do the bidding of the international oil consortium and facilitate building the pipeline and protecting it from saboteurs and other unpleasant types. . . To which I can only say, both with regard to the Afghan pipeline and the oil industry in general in Iraq, eight years on: "How's that working out?"

David Kilcullen, an Australian counterinsurgency guru who is said to have briefed both Barack Obama and John McCain during the campaign last year and is considered one of the strategists behind the "surge" in Iraq, has recently published a book, The Accidental Guerrilla, that explains some of the reasons the U.S. "should avoid such interventions wherever possible, simply because the costs are so high and the benefits so doubtful." Among the many problems is that U.S. intervention provokes a backlash that leads many who would never have considered doing so otherwise to become "accidental guerrillas." . . . there may be some oil industry people who still think that heavy U.S. military and foreign-aid intervention into and management of resource-rich regions is just the ticket. It may be that Dick Cheney thought he was doing his buddies in the oil industry a favor with the invasion of Iraq, but such thinking is shortsighted and ultimately incorrect.

here's an oil/gas-related afghanistan timeline (and some highlights):

http://www.ringnebula.com/Oil/Timeline.htm

1995: Unocal, seeking to build a pipeline across Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan (for delivery to energy hungry Asia via the Pakistani Arabian Sea coast), signed an agreement with Turkmenistan for natural gas purchasing rights for transport through a proposed pipeline.

1997: US Congress passed a resolution declaring the Caspian and Caucasus region to be a "zone of vital American interests."

Dec. 1997: Unocal invited Taliban representatives to their corporate headquarters in Sugarland, TX. (11) to discuss the pipeline project. They were thereafter invited to Washington for meetings with Clinton Administration officials.

Jan. 1998: Unocal agreement signed between Pakistan, Turkmenistan, and the Taliban to arrange funding of the gas pipeline project, with Unocal also considering a Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-Arabian Sea coast oil pipeline. VP Dick Cheney, then CEO of the giant oil services company, Halliburton, stated: "I cannot think of a time when we have had a region emerge as suddenly to become as strategically significant as the Caspian."

Feb. 1998: Unocal VP International Relations addressed US House of Representatives(14) clearly stating that the Taliban government should be removed and replaced by a government acceptable to his company. He argued that creation of a 42 inch oil pipeline across Afghanistan would yield a Western profit increase of 500% by 2015.

Dec. 1998: The Trade and Development Agency commissioned Enron to perform a feasibility study (20) re: an east-to-west route, crossing the Caspian Mountains and terminating in Turkey along the Mediterranean. (The route was considered impractical as it would cost an estimated $1 billion more than a route through Afghanistan.) Unocal issued a statement (21) that it had withdrawn from the pipeline project on 12/4/98, noting "business reasons."

Apr. 1999: Excluding US interests, Afghanistan, Pakistan, & Turkmenistan reactivated the pipeline project.

Jul. 1999: An executive order (13129) was issued by Clinton, freezing US held Taliban assets (23), & prohibiting trade plus other transactions.

Oct. 1999: UN Security Council Resolution 1267 imposed sanctions on the Taliban (24a), demanding that the Taliban "turn over the terrorist Usama Bin Laden without further delay..."

Jan. 2001: Upon taking office, the Bush administration immediately engaged in active negotiations with Taliban representatives (27) with meetings in Washington, DC, Berlin, and Islamabad. During this time the Taliban government hired Laila Helms, niece of former CIA director Richard Helms (28), as their go-between in negotiations with the US government.

Bush (oil) administration (29) includes:
* Dick Cheney, VP: Until 2000 - President of Halliburton (in position to build the Afghan pipeline).
* Condoleezza Rice, National Security Advisor: 1991-2000 - Manager of Chevron Oil, and Kazakhstan go-between.
* Donald Evans, Sec. Commerce: former CEO, Tom Brown, Inc. (a $1.2 billion oil company).
* Gale Norton, Sec. Interior: former national chairwoman of the Coalition of Republican Environmental Advocates - funded by, among others, BP Amoco.
* Spencer Abraham, Sec. Energy: Up through his failed bid for senatorial reelection in the 2000, he received more oil and gas industry money than all but three other senators (January 1997 through July 2000) (30).
* Thomas White, Secretary of the Army: former Vice Chairman of Enron and a large shareholder of that company's stock.

May 2001: Regarding the placement of the Unocal Pipeline, a US Official delivered this ultimatum to the Taliban (via the Pakistani delegation acting as their interlocutors): "Either you accept our offer of a carpet of gold, or we bury you under a carpet of bombs."

JULY 2001: Niaz Naik, a former Pakistani Foreign Secretary, was told by senior American officials in mid-July (34a) that military action against Afghanistan would go ahead by the middle of October. (See also BBC report(34b))

Aug. 2001: Last meeting with the Taliban (5 weeks before the 9/11/01 attack). Christina Rocca, in charge of Central Asian affairs for US government, met with the Taliban Ambassador to Pakistan (Abdul Salam Zaeef) in Islamabad, at which time Taliban representatives were reminded that the US had provided monetary relief assistance. (The above referenced State Department report fails to mention that oil topics were also discussed.)

John O'Neill - Deputy director FBI, established national expert on the al-Qaeda network and in charge of that investigation, resigned in protest over the Bush Administration's obstruction of those investigations.

Aug. 23, 2001: John O'Neill accepted position as chief of security, World Trade Center buildings. NOTE: Electronic security for the World Trade Center was provided by Securacom (now Stratesec), a company initially founded with Kuwaiti capital. Marvin P. Bush, President George W. Bush's youngest brother served as a Securicom/Stratesec board member from 1993 through 2000.

Sept. 4-11, 2001: July - Sept. 2000 - Pakistani Intelligence Chief (ISI) Lt. General Mahmoud Ahmad reportedly instructed British born Saeed Sheikh (alias: Ahmad Umar Sheikh, Mustafa Muhammad Ahmed, ....) in Pakistan to wire $100,000 (7/00-9/00) to two Florida bank accounts held by hijacker Mohammed Atta. Lt. General Ahmad entered the United States and subsequently met with many top officials within the Bush Administration.

Sept. 11, 2001: - Lt. General Ahmad concluded a breakfast meeting with Senator Bob Graham (D-FL), Representative Porter Goss (R-FL), and Senator Jon Kyl (R-AZ). (Graham and Goss subsequently served as CO-Chairs of the Joint-Intelligence Committee investigating the 9/11 attacks.) During Ahmad's brief stay in the US, he also met with: Secretary of State Colin Powell, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, US Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Marc Grossman, and the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Sen. Joseph Biden (D-DE).

World Trade Center attacked by al Qaeda; fifteen of the nineteen were from Saudi Arabia. John O'Neill, WTC security chief, and former deputy director of the FBI, where he headed investigation of the al-Qaeda network, was killed in those buildings on that day.

Oct. 7, 2001: Military operations with aerial bombardment began in Afghanistan.

Oct. 31, 2001: The Bush White House drafted an unprecedented executive order (43a) sealing presidential records including those of prior administrations.

Dec. 22, 2001: The US-backed interim government headed by Hamid Karzai took office in Kabul, Afghanistan.

(Hamid Karzai had formerly functioned as a Unocal Corporation consultant)

Dec. 31, 2001: Bush appointed Zalmay Khalilzad, as his Special Envoy to Afghanistan. Zhalilzad, like Karzai had earlier functioned as a Unocal consultant, participating in 1997 talks between Unocal and Taliban officials. (Regarding Zhalilzad's "neocon" credentials, See: 45b).

Jan. 29, 2002: CNN reported: "President Bush personally asked Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle Tuesday to limit the congressional investigation into the events of 9/11/01"

Feb. 2002: Proposal to deploy US Special Operations forces to the Caucasus state of Georgia (would help enforce a Washington pipeline policy - neutralizing Russian influence in Central Asia.)

May 2002: Afghanistan's Hamid Karzai to hold talks with his Pakistani and Turkmenistan counterparts regarding a pipeline from Turkmenistan, through Afghanistan, and through Pakistan to the coast. Mohammad Alim Razim, Afghanistan's minister for Mines and Industries, stated Unocal was considered "the lead company" to build the pipeline. (See also: 47d.)

May 2002: Afghanistan, Pakistan and Turkmenistan agreed to construct a gas pipeline to the subcontinent.

i don't like the look of that time line.