An Open Letter to President George W. Bush

Commentary by Michael Bonanno.

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An Open Letter to President George W. Bush

Post by Michael » July 14th, 2005, 7:05 pm

Dear Mr. President,

I’ve read two books recently that I highly recommend to you. They are both by the same author, David Ray Griffin.

One is called “The New Pearl Harbor; Disturbing Questions about the Bush Administration and 9/11”. If the title rings a bell for you, I’m not surprised.

The Project for a New American Century, an advocacy group which many of your close acquaintances and members of your administration belong to, wrote, “the process of transformation, even if it brings revolutionary change, is likely to be a long one, absent some catastrophic and catalyzing event – like a new Pearl Harbor.”

It is also rumored that, on the evening of September 11, 2001, you wrote the following in your diary, “The Pearl Harbor of the 21st century took place today.”

It’s pretty obvious in hindsight that you had a motive for being complicit in the planning of and carrying out the attacks on American lives and property. After all, the attacks allowed you to manipulate a congress that is beholden to its constituencies. Congress gave you poorly defined, open ended powers to create war where ever and whenever you can be convinced that there is even a minute chance that plans may someday be drawn up for the purpose of disturbing “American interests”. Almost every single member of both houses endorsed this all encompassing, sweeping Executive Branch power lest they be thought of as unpatriotic.

The Patriot Act, an act which can keep the most a-political people “in line”, was another “opportunity” that arose from the September 11 attacks.

Public support for an invasion of Iraq was another benefit from the attacks. After all, Iraq is in The Middle East, the greatest portion of its population practices the religion of Islam and it was lead by a “tyrant” against whom we previously fought. This tyrant, Saddam Hussein, was very easy for you and your administration to demonize.

Of course, some of the demonizing to which you and your supporters refer involves Saddam using chemical and biological weapons against his own people as well as his neighbors. You never mention that we were allied with Iraq when most of that was taking place. You also fail to mention that Saddam got many of his weapons of mass destruction, as well as technical training on how to use them, from The United States of America. Leaving those facts out of the demonizing process is fairly weak, don’t you think, Sir?

As bad as Saddam was, neither he nor his country were involved in the attacks of 9/11, even according to the official account.

Griffin’s second book, “The 9/11 Commission Report; Omissions and Distortions”, was almost not written and published. You fought an independent investigation into what happened on 9/11 and you fought it hard.

You finally gave in. You just placed a couple of caveats on the commission.

First, you insisted that you choose the members of the commission. I look at that and wonder how it must feel to be a common criminal in this country. I’m sure you know seeing that you ended the lives of so many of them when you were governor of Texas.

Secondly, you promised that you and Vice President Cheney would “speak” to the 9/11 Commission, but you would only do so in private and not under oath. I wonder what you would have said differently to the commission if you testified before them in public and under oath. I wonder why you made a distinction.

Someone who is being investigated for criminal activity doesn’t usually get to choose his or her judge and jury. She or he also is not given the opportunity to decide whether testimony will be under oath or not.

Of course, you can always say that The 9/11 Commission wasn’t investigating you.

This brings out another aspect of the commission’s investigation. The commission entered their investigation into what happened starting at a point which already identified the accomplices. It seems to me, Sir, that, when investigating a crime, the first thing is to determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, who committed the crime. Proving or disproving innocence or guilt should be a next step. For those of us who must use the US judicial system, we are tried based upon evidence, even circumstantial evidence. If there is a strong enough motive, then circumstantial evidence may very well be the basis for putting a person away.

I’ve already pointed out the motives that you and your administration had for committing the crimes of September 11, 2001. Professor Griffin, of course, goes much deeper and further in his books. Again, I highly recommend your taking the time to read them.

The motive, according to your very own words, Sir, for the nineteen hijackers was your allegation that they did what they did because “they hate us for our freedom”.

I know you’re The President of the United States, Sir, but your statement must still fall into the realm of circumstantial evidence. Did any of these nineteen hijackers actually tell you that they did what they did because “they hate us for our freedom?” If so, then you must either communicate with the dead or you spoke to them before the attacks. It can’t be the latter because that would prove that you knew about the upcoming attacks. I believe, and this is merely my opinion, that you had no idea if they committed their heinous act because they “hate us for our freedom”.

If you read Professor Griffin’s books, Mr. President, you’d find much more evidence that you were involved than evidence that points to the hijackers.

I asked myself if you had any motive for being complicit in the recent London bombings. Amazingly enough, I think you did.

I believe that the polls which show a decline in support for your Iraq war provided an interesting motive to create yet another “Pearl Harbor”, albeit a smaller one. It’s a bit early to see just how successful you were.

One bit of circumstantial evidence that’s already surfaced is the fact that Israel’s Treasury Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was supposed to attend a meeting in a building just above the tube in which one of the blasts took place. There is speculation the Netanyahu was warned by his own government, a close ally of the US, not to attend the meeting. He did not attend the meeting.

Another interesting fact about the London bombings that could be construed as circumstantial evidence is the fact that, like you, Prime Minister Blair doesn’t want an official inquiry into what happened in London on June 7, 2005.

What is it with “terrorist attacks” and the fear possessed by governmental leaders towards independent investigations, Mr. President? I know you can’t speak for Prime Minister Blair, but, as you also fought such an investigation and you are a close “friend” of the Prime Minister, you may have a feel for why he doesn’t want to investigate an act that killed his countrymen.

I’m now doing some research into whether any terrorist bombings, starting with the first bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993, coincided with any particular political event. I haven’t gotten too far.

Of course, Bali happened in October, 2002. That “terrorist attack” took place about five months before you officially began military operations in Iraq. Were you having any trouble talking John Howard into joining the “coalition of the willing?” What better way could there have been to raise anger and fear among Australians than to kill a few of them and blame it on Middle Easterners?

Speaking of Al Qaeda, Sir, I find it extremely interesting that you’ve found and are getting ready to try Saddam Hussein, a man who led a country that had nothing to do with 9/11 and haven’t been able to find Osama bin Laden, the person you’ve called the mastermind behind the 9/11 attacks. That’s almost as interesting as the way you seemed to play down the capturing of bin Laden not long after 9/11.

It’s pretty well known that the bin Laden family and the Bush family were fairly close throughout the years. I wonder, how well did you know Osama while you both were young? Did you know him well enough to possibly be working with him to carry out these attacks? Is bin Laden sending young men to their deaths to help you achieve your belligerent goals? I just wonder.

So, with the exceptions of 9/11, Bali and London, I haven’t researched any other “terrorist attacks” to this point. I figure I’ll look into the 1998 bombings of American embassies in Africa, the 2000 bombing of The USS Cole, even the Madrid bombings which led to Spain’s withdrawal from “the coalition of the willing”. Did that one backfire on you, Mr. President? I guess not everyone reacts to violence with the hateful revenge that you would like to see.

In closing, Sir, if you have any information that would help me in my research, like an American version of The Downing Street Memos, please feel free to send it to me. I’m sure you already have contact information for me.

Thanks in advance.

Michael Bonanno

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Post by jimboloco » July 28th, 2005, 5:49 pm

your letter works up to the point where you accuse Dubya of complicity in the Al-Qaida attacks. May as well acuse BillyBob the penus Clinton of this as well.

When we were driving home from Milwaukee, me and my wife, just after 9-11, drove our rental car home to Florida, no air travel, we had stopped at a freeway rest stop in Kentucky. An older gent and his wife got out of their car next to us and he said to me, "now all those liberals will be yelling about constitutional freedom!"

Downing street, yes, manipulation, yes, pals with the Sheikdumb, yes, absurd tactics, Believing in software manipulation and voting fraud, yes.
yes, elitist neo-cons, yes, but no direct causation on Dumbya's part with AlQaida, it's not real, man.

Better to keep a level head when dealing with the usurper.
[color=darkcyan]i'm on a survival mission
yo ho ho an a bottle of rum om[/color]

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Post by Zlatko Waterman » July 28th, 2005, 8:39 pm

Here's Robert Kagan's long ( very long) essay "Power and Weakness", originally published in "Policy Review" magazine, then subsequently as a small ( 112 page) book.

This essay is recommended reading on the "Project for the New American Century" website.

Kagan's "pragmatic" view is worth reading carefully, since it has inspired a number of policy decisions by the Bush administration, Bush's minions, and other theorists who contribute to the direction of American foreign policy.

If you think this is too long, Doreen, just delete it.


By the way, here's some commentary on Robert Kagan and his ideas: ... ocons.html

( paste)

Power and Weakness

By Robert Kagan

It is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world, or even that they occupy the same world. On the all-important question of power — the efficacy of power, the morality of power, the desirability of power — American and European perspectives are diverging. Europe is turning away from power, or to put it a little differently, it is moving beyond power into a self-contained world of laws and rules and transnational negotiation and cooperation. It is entering a post-historical paradise of peace and relative prosperity, the realization of Kant’s “Perpetual Peace.” The United States, meanwhile, remains mired in history, exercising power in the anarchic Hobbesian world where international laws and rules are unreliable and where true security and the defense and promotion of a liberal order still depend on the possession and use of military might. That is why on major strategic and international questions today, Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus: They agree on little and understand one another less and less. And this state of affairs is not transitory — the product of one American election or one catastrophic event. The reasons for the transatlantic divide are deep, long in development, and likely to endure. When it comes to setting national priorities, determining threats, defining challenges, and fashioning and implementing foreign and defense policies, the United States and Europe have parted ways.

It is easier to see the contrast as an American living in Europe. Europeans are more conscious of the growing differences, perhaps because they fear them more. European intellectuals are nearly unanimous in the conviction that Americans and Europeans no longer share a common “strategic culture.” The European caricature at its most extreme depicts an America dominated by a “culture of death,” its warlike temperament the natural product of a violent society where every man has a gun and the death penalty reigns. But even those who do not make this crude link agree there are profound differences in the way the United States and Europe conduct foreign policy.

The United States, they argue, resorts to force more quickly and, compared with Europe, is less patient with diplomacy. Americans generally see the world divided between good and evil, between friends and enemies, while Europeans see a more complex picture. When confronting real or potential adversaries, Americans generally favor policies of coercion rather than persuasion, emphasizing punitive sanctions over inducements to better behavior, the stick over the carrot. Americans tend to seek finality in international affairs: They want problems solved, threats eliminated. And, of course, Americans increasingly tend toward unilateralism in international affairs. They are less inclined to act through international institutions such as the United Nations, less inclined to work cooperatively with other nations to pursue common goals, more skeptical about international law, and more willing to operate outside its strictures when they deem it necessary, or even merely useful.1

Europeans insist they approach problems with greater nuance and sophistication. They try to influence others through subtlety and indirection. They are more tolerant of failure, more patient when solutions don’t come quickly. They generally favor peaceful responses to problems, preferring negotiation, diplomacy, and persuasion to coercion. They are quicker to appeal to international law, international conventions, and international opinion to adjudicate disputes. They try to use commercial and economic ties to bind nations together. They often emphasize process over result, believing that ultimately process can become substance.

This European dual portrait is a caricature, of course, with its share of exaggerations and oversimplifications. One cannot generalize about Europeans: Britons may have a more “American” view of power than many of their fellow Europeans on the continent. And there are differing perspectives within nations on both sides of the Atlantic. In the U.S., Democrats often seem more “European” than Republicans; Secretary of State Colin Powell may appear more “European” than Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. Many Americans, especially among the intellectual elite, are as uncomfortable with the “hard” quality of American foreign policy as any European; and some Europeans value power as much as any American.

Nevertheless, the caricatures do capture an essential truth: The United States and Europe are fundamentally different today. Powell and Rumsfeld have more in common than do Powell and Hubert Védrine or even Jack Straw. When it comes to the use of force, mainstream American Democrats have more in common with Republicans than they do with most European Socialists and Social Democrats. During the 1990s even American liberals were more willing to resort to force and were more Manichean in their perception of the world than most of their European counterparts. The Clinton administration bombed Iraq, as well as Afghanistan and Sudan. European governments, it is safe to say, would not have done so. Whether they would have bombed even Belgrade in 1999, had the U.S. not forced their hand, is an interesting question.2

What is the source of these differing strategic perspectives? The question has received too little attention in recent years, either because foreign policy intellectuals and policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic have denied the existence of a genuine difference or because those who have pointed to the difference, especially in Europe, have been more interested in assailing the United States than in understanding why the United States acts as it does —or, for that matter, why Europe acts as it does. It is past time to move beyond the denial and the insults and to face the problem head-on.

Despite what many Europeans and some Americans believe, these differences in strategic culture do not spring naturally from the national characters of Americans and Europeans. After all, what Europeans now consider their more peaceful strategic culture is, historically speaking, quite new. It represents an evolution away from the very different strategic culture that dominated Europe for hundreds of years and at least until World War I. The European governments — and peoples — who enthusiastically launched themselves into that continental war believed in machtpolitik. While the roots of the present European worldview, like the roots of the European Union itself, can be traced back to the Enlightenment, Europe’s great-power politics for the past 300 years did not follow the visionary designs of the philosophes and the physiocrats.

As for the United States, there is nothing timeless about the present heavy reliance on force as a tool of international relations, nor about the tilt toward unilateralism and away from a devotion to international law. Americans are children of the Enlightenment, too, and in the early years of the republic were more faithful apostles of its creed. America’s eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century statesmen sounded much like the European statesmen of today, extolling the virtues of commerce as the soothing balm of international strife and appealing to international law and international opinion over brute force. The young United States wielded power against weaker peoples on the North American continent, but when it came to dealing with the European giants, it claimed to abjure power and assailed as atavistic the power politics of the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century European empires.

Two centuries later, Americans and Europeans have traded places — and perspectives. Partly this is because in those 200 years, but especially in recent decades, the power equation has shifted dramatically: When the United States was weak, it practiced the strategies of indirection, the strategies of weakness; now that the United States is powerful, it behaves as powerful nations do. When the European great powers were strong, they believed in strength and martial glory. Now, they see the world through the eyes of weaker powers. These very different points of view, weak versus strong, have naturally produced differing strategic judgments, differing assessments of threats and of the proper means of addressing threats, and even differing calculations of interest.

But this is only part of the answer. For along with these natural consequences of the transatlantic power gap, there has also opened a broad ideological gap. Europe, because of its unique historical experience of the past half-century — culminating in the past decade with the creation of the European Union — has developed a set of ideals and principles regarding the utility and morality of power different from the ideals and principles of Americans, who have not shared that experience. If the strategic chasm between the United States and Europe appears greater than ever today, and grows still wider at a worrying pace, it is because these material and ideological differences reinforce one another. The divisive trend they together produce may be impossible to reverse.

The power gap: perception and reality

urope has been militarily weak for a long time, but until fairly recently its weakness had been obscured. World War II all but destroyed European nations as global powers, and their postwar inability to project sufficient force overseas to maintain colonial empires in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East forced them to retreat on a massive scale after more than five centuries of imperial dominance — perhaps the most significant retrenchment of global influence in human history. For a half-century after World War II, however, this weakness was masked by the unique geopolitical circumstances of the Cold War. Dwarfed by the two superpowers on its flanks, a weakened Europe nevertheless served as the central strategic theater of the worldwide struggle between communism and democratic capitalism. Its sole but vital strategic mission was to defend its own territory against any Soviet offensive, at least until the Americans arrived. Although shorn of most traditional measures of great-power status, Europe remained the geopolitical pivot, and this, along with lingering habits of world leadership, allowed Europeans to retain international influence well beyond what their sheer military capabilities might have afforded.

Europe lost this strategic centrality after the Cold War ended, but it took a few more years for the lingering mirage of European global power to fade. During the 1990s, war in the Balkans kept both Europeans and Americans focused on the strategic importance of the continent and on the continuing relevance of nato. The enlargement of nato to include former Warsaw Pact nations and the consolidation of the Cold War victory kept Europe in the forefront of the strategic discussion.

Then there was the early promise of the “new Europe.” By bonding together into a single political and economic unit — the historic accomplishment of the Maastricht treaty in 1992 — many hoped to recapture Europe’s old greatness but in a new political form. “Europe” would be the next superpower, not only economically and politically, but also militarily. It would handle crises on the European continent, such as the ethnic conflicts in the Balkans, and it would re-emerge as a global player. In the 1990s Europeans could confidently assert that the power of a unified Europe would restore, finally, the global “multipolarity” that had been destroyed by the Cold War and its aftermath. And most Americans, with mixed emotions, agreed that superpower Europe was the future. Harvard University’s Samuel P. Huntington predicted that the coalescing of the European Union would be “the single most important move” in a worldwide reaction against American hegemony and would produce a “truly multipolar” twenty-first century.3

But European pretensions and American apprehensions proved unfounded. The 1990s witnessed not the rise of a European superpower but the decline of Europe into relative weakness. The Balkan conflict at the beginning of the decade revealed European military incapacity and political disarray; the Kosovo conflict at decade’s end exposed a transatlantic gap in military technology and the ability to wage modern warfare that would only widen in subsequent years. Outside of Europe, the disparity by the close of the 1990s was even more starkly apparent as it became clear that the ability of European powers, individually or collectively, to project decisive force into regions of conflict beyond the continent was negligible. Europeans could provide peacekeeping forces in the Balkans — indeed, they could and eventually did provide the vast bulk of those forces in Bosnia and Kosovo. But they lacked the wherewithal to introduce and sustain a fighting force in potentially hostile territory, even in Europe. Under the best of circumstances, the European role was limited to filling out peacekeeping forces after the United States had, largely on its own, carried out the decisive phases of a military mission and stabilized the situation. As some Europeans put it, the real division of labor consisted of the United States “making the dinner” and the Europeans “doing the dishes.”

This inadequacy should have come as no surprise, since these were the limitations that had forced Europe to retract its global influence in the first place. Those Americans and Europeans who proposed that Europe expand its strategic role beyond the continent set an unreasonable goal. During the Cold War, Europe’s strategic role had been to defend itself. It was unrealistic to expect a return to international great-power status, unless European peoples were willing to shift significant resources from social programs to military programs.

Clearly they were not. Not only were Europeans unwilling to pay to project force beyond Europe. After the Cold War, they would not pay for sufficient force to conduct even minor military actions on the continent without American help. Nor did it seem to matter whether European publics were being asked to spend money to strengthen nato or an independent European foreign and defense policy. Their answer was the same. Rather than viewing the collapse of the Soviet Union as an opportunity to flex global muscles, Europeans took it as an opportunity to cash in on a sizable peace dividend. Average European defense budgets gradually fell below 2 percent of gdp. Despite talk of establishing Europe as a global superpower, therefore, European military capabilities steadily fell behind those of the United States throughout the 1990s.

The end of the Cold War had a very different effect on the other side of the Atlantic. For although Americans looked for a peace dividend, too, and defense budgets declined or remained flat during most of the 1990s, defense spending still remained above 3 percent of gdp. Fast on the heels of the Soviet empire’s demise came Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and the largest American military action in a quarter-century. Thereafter American administrations cut the Cold War force, but not as dramatically as might have been expected. By historical standards, America’s military power and particularly its ability to project that power to all corners of the globe remained unprecedented.

Meanwhile, the very fact of the Soviet empire’s collapse vastly increased America’s strength relative to the rest of the world. The sizable American military arsenal, once barely sufficient to balance Soviet power, was now deployed in a world without a single formidable adversary. This “unipolar moment” had an entirely natural and predictable consequence: It made the United States more willing to use force abroad. With the check of Soviet power removed, the United States was free to intervene practically wherever and whenever it chose — a fact reflected in the proliferation of overseas military interventions that began during the first Bush administration with the invasion of Panama in 1989, the Persian Gulf War in 1991, and the humanitarian intervention in Somalia in 1992, continuing during the Clinton years with interventions in Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. While American politicians talked of pulling back from the world, the reality was an America intervening abroad more frequently than it had throughout most of the Cold War. Thanks to new technologies, the United States was also freer to use force around the world in more limited ways through air and missile strikes, which it did with increasing frequency.

How could this growing transatlantic power gap fail to create a difference in strategic perceptions? Even during the Cold War, American military predominance and Europe’s relative weakness had produced important and sometimes serious disagreements. Gaullism, Ostpolitik, and the various movements for European independence and unity were manifestations not only of a European desire for honor and freedom of action. They also reflected a European conviction that America’s approach to the Cold War was too confrontational, too militaristic, and too dangerous. Europeans believed they knew better how to deal with the Soviets: through engagement and seduction, through commercial and political ties, through patience and forbearance. It was a legitimate view, shared by many Americans. But it also reflected Europe’s weakness relative to the United States, the fewer military options at Europe’s disposal, and its greater vulnerability to a powerful Soviet Union. It may have reflected, too, Europe’s memory of continental war. Americans, when they were not themselves engaged in the subtleties of détente, viewed the European approach as a form of appeasement, a return to the fearful mentality of the 1930s. But appeasement is never a dirty word to those whose genuine weakness offers few appealing alternatives. For them, it is a policy of sophistication.

The end of the Cold War, by widening the power gap, exacerbated the disagreements. Although transatlantic tensions are now widely assumed to have begun with the inauguration of George W. Bush in January 2001, they were already evident during the Clinton administration and may even be traced back to the administration of George H.W. Bush. By 1992, mutual recriminations were rife over Bosnia, where the United States refused to act and Europe could not act. It was during the Clinton years that Europeans began complaining about being lectured by the “hectoring hegemon.” This was also the period in which Védrine coined the term hyperpuissance to describe an American behemoth too worryingly powerful to be designated merely a superpower. (Perhaps he was responding to then-Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s insistence that the United States was the world’s “indispensable nation.”) It was also during the 1990s that the transatlantic disagreement over American plans for missile defense emerged and many Europeans began grumbling about the American propensity to choose force and punishment over diplomacy and persuasion.

The Clinton administration, meanwhile, though relatively timid and restrained itself, grew angry and impatient with European timidity, especially the unwillingness to confront Saddam Hussein. The split in the alliance over Iraq didn’t begin with the 2000 election but in 1997, when the Clinton administration tried to increase the pressure on Baghdad and found itself at odds with France and (to a lesser extent) Great Britain in the United Nations Security Council. Even the war in Kosovo was marked by nervousness among some allies — especially Italy, Greece, and Germany — that the United States was too uncompromisingly militaristic in its approach. And while Europeans and Americans ultimately stood together in the confrontation with Belgrade, the Kosovo war produced in Europe less satisfaction at the successful prosecution of the war than unease at America’s apparent omnipotence. That apprehension would only increase in the wake of American military action after September 11, 2001.

The psychology of power and weakness

oday’s transatlantic problem, in short, is not a George Bush problem. It is a power problem. American military strength has produced a propensity to use that strength. Europe’s military weakness has produced a perfectly understandable aversion to the exercise of military power. Indeed, it has produced a powerful European interest in inhabiting a world where strength doesn’t matter, where international law and international institutions predominate, where unilateral action by powerful nations is forbidden, where all nations regardless of their strength have equal rights and are equally protected by commonly agreed-upon international rules of behavior. Europeans have a deep interest in devaluing and eventually eradicating the brutal laws of an anarchic, Hobbesian world where power is the ultimate determinant of national security and success.

This is no reproach. It is what weaker powers have wanted from time immemorial. It was what Americans wanted in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, when the brutality of a European system of power politics run by the global giants of France, Britain, and Russia left Americans constantly vulnerable to imperial thrashing. It was what the other small powers of Europe wanted in those years, too, only to be sneered at by Bourbon kings and other powerful monarchs, who spoke instead of raison d’état. The great proponent of international law on the high seas in the eighteenth century was the United States; the great opponent was Britain’s navy, the “Mistress of the Seas.” In an anarchic world, small powers always fear they will be victims. Great powers, on the other hand, often fear rules that may constrain them more than they fear the anarchy in which their power brings security and prosperity.

This natural and historic disagreement between the stronger and the weaker manifests itself in today’s transatlantic dispute over the question of unilateralism. Europeans generally believe their objection to American unilateralism is proof of their greater commitment to certain ideals concerning world order. They are less willing to acknowledge that their hostility to unilateralism is also self-interested. Europeans fear American unilateralism. They fear it perpetuates a Hobbesian world in which they may become increasingly vulnerable. The United States may be a relatively benign hegemon, but insofar as its actions delay the arrival of a world order more conducive to the safety of weaker powers, it is objectively dangerous.

This is one reason why in recent years a principal objective of European foreign policy has become, as one European observer puts it, the “multilateralising” of the United States.4 It is not that Europeans are teaming up against the American hegemon, as Huntington and many realist theorists would have it, by creating a countervailing power. After all, Europeans are not increasing their power. Their tactics, like their goal, are the tactics of the weak. They hope to constrain American power without wielding power themselves. In what may be the ultimate feat of subtlety and indirection, they want to control the behemoth by appealing to its conscience.

It is a sound strategy, as far as it goes. The United States is a behemoth with a conscience. It is not Louis xiv’s France or George iii’s England. Americans do not argue, even to themselves, that their actions may be justified by raison d’état. Americans have never accepted the principles of Europe’s old order, never embraced the Machiavellian perspective. The United States is a liberal, progressive society through and through, and to the extent that Americans believe in power, they believe it must be a means of advancing the principles of a liberal civilization and a liberal world order. Americans even share Europe’s aspirations for a more orderly world system based not on power but on rules — after all, they were striving for such a world when Europeans were still extolling the laws of machtpolitik.

But while these common ideals and aspirations shape foreign policies on both sides of the Atlantic, they cannot completely negate the very different perspectives from which Europeans and Americans view the world and the role of power in international affairs. Europeans oppose unilateralism in part because they have no capacity for unilateralism. Polls consistently show that Americans support multilateral action in principle — they even support acting under the rubric of the United Nations — but the fact remains that the United States can act unilaterally, and has done so many times with reasonable success. For Europeans, the appeal to multilateralism and international law has a real practical payoff and little cost. For Americans, who stand to lose at least some freedom of action, support for universal rules of behavior really is a matter of idealism.

Even when Americans and Europeans can agree on the kind of world order they would strive to build, however, they increasingly disagree about what constitutes a threat to that international endeavor. Indeed, Europeans and Americans differ most these days in their evaluation of what constitutes a tolerable versus an intolerable threat. This, too, is consistent with the disparity of power.

Europeans often argue that Americans have an unreasonable demand for “perfect” security, the product of living for centuries shielded behind two oceans.5 Europeans claim they know what it is like to live with danger, to exist side-by-side with evil, since they’ve done it for centuries. Hence their greater tolerance for such threats as may be posed by Saddam Hussein’s Iraq or the ayatollahs’ Iran. Americans, they claim, make far too much of the dangers these regimes pose.

Even before September 11, this argument rang a bit hollow. The United States in its formative decades lived in a state of substantial insecurity, surrounded by hostile European empires, at constant risk of being torn apart by centrifugal forces that were encouraged by threats from without: National insecurity formed the core of Washington’s Farewell Address. As for the Europeans’ supposed tolerance for insecurity and evil, it can be overstated. For the better part of three centuries, European Catholics and Protestants more often preferred to kill than to tolerate each other; nor have the past two centuries shown all that much mutual tolerance between Frenchmen and Germans.

Some Europeans argue that precisely because Europe has suffered so much, it has a higher tolerance for suffering than America and therefore a higher tolerance for threats. More likely the opposite is true. The memory of their horrendous suffering in World War I made the British and French publics more fearful of Nazi Germany, not more tolerant, and this attitude contributed significantly to the appeasement of the 1930s.

A better explanation of Europe’s greater tolerance for threats is, once again, Europe’s relative weakness. Tolerance is also very much a realistic response in that Europe, precisely because it is weak, actually faces fewer threats than the far more powerful United States.

The psychology of weakness is easy enough to understand. A man armed only with a knife may decide that a bear prowling the forest is a tolerable danger, inasmuch as the alternative — hunting the bear armed only with a knife — is actually riskier than lying low and hoping the bear never attacks. The same man armed with a rifle, however, will likely make a different calculation of what constitutes a tolerable risk. Why should he risk being mauled to death if he doesn’t need to?

This perfectly normal human psychology is helping to drive a wedge between the United States and Europe today. Europeans have concluded, reasonably enough, that the threat posed by Saddam Hussein is more tolerable for them than the risk of removing him. But Americans, being stronger, have reasonably enough developed a lower threshold of tolerance for Saddam and his weapons of mass destruction, especially after September 11. Europeans like to say that Americans are obsessed with fixing problems, but it is generally true that those with a greater capacity to fix problems are more likely to try to fix them than those who have no such capability. Americans can imagine successfully invading Iraq and toppling Saddam, and therefore more than 70 percent of Americans apparently favor such action. Europeans, not surprisingly, find the prospect both unimaginable and frightening.

The incapacity to respond to threats leads not only to tolerance but sometimes to denial. It’s normal to try to put out of one’s mind that which one can do nothing about. According to one student of European opinion, even the very focus on “threats” differentiates American policymakers from their European counterparts. Americans, writes Steven Everts, talk about foreign “threats” such as “the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and ‘rogue states.’” But Europeans look at “challenges,” such as “ethnic conflict, migration, organized crime, poverty and environmental degradation.” As Everts notes, however, the key difference is less a matter of culture and philosophy than of capability. Europeans “are most worried about issues . . . that have a greater chance of being solved by political engagement and huge sums of money.” In other words, Europeans focus on issues — “challenges” — where European strengths come into play but not on those “threats” where European weakness makes solutions elusive. If Europe’s strategic culture today places less value on power and military strength and more value on such soft-power tools as economics and trade, isn’t it partly because Europe is militarily weak and economically strong? Americans are quicker to acknowledge the existence of threats, even to perceive them where others may not see any, because they can conceive of doing something to meet those threats.

The differing threat perceptions in the United States and Europe are not just matters of psychology, however. They are also grounded in a practical reality that is another product of the disparity of power. For Iraq and other “rogue” states objectively do not pose the same level of threat to Europeans as they do to the United States. There is, first of all, the American security guarantee that Europeans enjoy and have enjoyed for six decades, ever since the United States took upon itself the burden of maintaining order in far-flung regions of the world — from the Korean Peninsula to the Persian Gulf — from which European power had largely withdrawn. Europeans generally believe, whether or not they admit it to themselves, that were Iraq ever to emerge as a real and present danger, as opposed to merely a potential danger, then the United States would do something about it — as it did in 1991. If during the Cold War Europe by necessity made a major contribution to its own defense, today Europeans enjoy an unparalleled measure of “free security” because most of the likely threats are in regions outside Europe, where only the United States can project effective force. In a very practical sense — that is, when it comes to actual strategic planning — neither Iraq nor Iran nor North Korea nor any other “rogue” state in the world is primarily a European problem. Nor, certainly, is China. Both Europeans and Americans agree that these are primarily American problems.

This is why Saddam Hussein is not as great a threat to Europe as he is to the United States. He would be a greater threat to the United States even were the Americans and Europeans in complete agreement on Iraq policy, because it is the logical consequence of the transatlantic disparity of power. The task of containing Saddam Hussein belongs primarily to the United States, not to Europe, and everyone agrees on this6 — including Saddam, which is why he considers the United States, not Europe, his principal adversary. In the Persian Gulf, in the Middle East, and in most other regions of the world (including Europe), the United States plays the role of ultimate enforcer. “You are so powerful,” Europeans often say to Americans. “So why do you feel so threatened?” But it is precisely America’s great power that makes it the primary target, and often the only target. Europeans are understandably content that it should remain so.

Americans are “cowboys,” Europeans love to say. And there is truth in this. The United States does act as an international sheriff, self-appointed perhaps but widely welcomed nevertheless, trying to enforce some peace and justice in what Americans see as a lawless world where outlaws need to be deterred or destroyed, and often through the muzzle of a gun. Europe, by this old West analogy, is more like a saloonkeeper. Outlaws shoot sheriffs, not saloonkeepers. In fact, from the saloonkeeper’s point of view, the sheriff trying to impose order by force can sometimes be more threatening than the outlaws who, at least for the time being, may just want a drink.

When Europeans took to the streets by the millions after September 11, most Americans believed it was out of a sense of shared danger and common interest: The Europeans knew they could be next. But Europeans by and large did not feel that way and still don’t. Europeans do not really believe they are next. They may be secondary targets — because they are allied with the U.S. — but they are not the primary target, because they no longer play the imperial role in the Middle East that might have engendered the same antagonism against them as is aimed at the United States. When Europeans wept and waved American flags after September 11, it was out of genuine human sympathy, sorrow, and affection for Americans. For better or for worse, European displays of solidarity were a product more of fellow-feeling than self-interest.

The origins of modern European foreign policy

mportant as the power gap may be in shaping the respective strategic cultures of the United States and Europe, it is only one part of the story. Europe in the past half-century has developed a genuinely different perspective on the role of power in international relations, a perspective that springs directly from its unique historical experience since the end of World War II. It is a perspective that Americans do not share and cannot share, inasmuch as the formative historical experiences on their side of the Atlantic have not been the same.

Consider again the qualities that make up the European strategic culture: the emphasis on negotiation, diplomacy, and commercial ties, on international law over the use of force, on seduction over coercion, on multilateralism over unilateralism. It is true that these are not traditionally European approaches to international relations when viewed from a long historical perspective. But they are a product of more recent European history. The modern European strategic culture represents a conscious rejection of the European past, a rejection of the evils of European machtpolitik. It is a reflection of Europeans’ ardent and understandable desire never to return to that past. Who knows better than Europeans the dangers that arise from unbridled power politics, from an excessive reliance on military force, from policies produced by national egoism and ambition, even from balance of power and raison d’état? As German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer put it in a speech outlining his vision of the European future at Humboldt University in Berlin (May 12, 2000), “The core of the concept of Europe after 1945 was and still is a rejection of the European balance-of-power principle and the hegemonic ambitions of individual states that had emerged following the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.” The European Union is itself the product of an awful century of European warfare.

Of course, it was the “hegemonic ambitions” of one nation in particular that European integration was meant to contain. And it is the integration and taming of Germany that is the great accomplishment of Europe — viewed historically, perhaps the greatest feat of international politics ever achieved. Some Europeans recall, as Fischer does, the central role played by the United States in solving the “German problem.” Fewer like to recall that the military destruction of Nazi Germany was the prerequisite for the European peace that followed. Most Europeans believe that it was the transformation of European politics, the deliberate abandonment and rejection of centuries of machtpolitik, that in the end made possible the “new order.” The Europeans, who invented power politics, turned themselves into born-again idealists by an act of will, leaving behind them what Fischer called “the old system of balance with its continued national orientation, constraints of coalition, traditional interest-led politics and the permanent danger of nationalist ideologies and confrontations.”

Fischer stands near one end of the spectrum of European idealism. But this is not really a right-left issue in Europe. Fischer’s principal contention — that Europe has moved beyond the old system of power politics and discovered a new system for preserving peace in international relations — is widely shared across Europe. As senior British diplomat Robert Cooper recently wrote in the Observer (April 7, 2002), Europe today lives in a “postmodern system” that does not rest on a balance of power but on “the rejection of force” and on “self-enforced rules of behavior.” In the “postmodern world,” writes Cooper, “raison d’état and the amorality of Machiavelli’s theories of statecraft . . . have been replaced by a moral consciousness” in international affairs.

American realists might scoff at this idealism. George F. Kennan assumed only his naïve fellow Americans succumbed to such “Wilsonian” legalistic and moralistic fancies, not those war-tested, historically minded European Machiavels. But, really, why shouldn’t Europeans be idealistic about international affairs, at least as they are conducted in Europe’s “postmodern system”? Within the confines of Europe, the age-old laws of international relations have been repealed. Europeans have stepped out of the Hobbesian world of anarchy into the Kantian world of perpetual peace. European life during the more than five decades since the end of World War II has been shaped not by the brutal laws of power politics but by the unfolding of a geopolitical fantasy, a miracle of world-historical importance: The German lion has laid down with the French lamb. The conflict that ravaged Europe ever since the violent birth of Germany in the nineteenth century has been put to rest.

The means by which this miracle has been achieved have understandably acquired something of a sacred mystique for Europeans, especially since the end of the Cold War. Diplomacy, negotiations, patience, the forging of economic ties, political engagement, the use of inducements rather than sanctions, the taking of small steps and tempering ambitions for success — these were the tools of Franco-German rapprochement and hence the tools that made European integration possible. Integration was not to be based on military deterrence or the balance of power. Quite the contrary. The miracle came from the rejection of military power and of its utility as an instrument of international affairs — at least within the confines of Europe. During the Cold War, few Europeans doubted the need for military power to deter the Soviet Union. But within Europe the rules were different.

Collective security was provided from without, meanwhile, by the deus ex machina of the United States operating through the military structures of nato. Within this wall of security, Europeans pursued their new order, freed from the brutal laws and even the mentality of power politics. This evolution from the old to the new began in Europe during the Cold War. But the end of the Cold War, by removing even the external danger of the Soviet Union, allowed Europe’s new order, and its new idealism, to blossom fully. Freed from the requirements of any military deterrence, internal or external, Europeans became still more confident that their way of settling international problems now had universal application.

“The genius of the founding fathers,” European Commission President Romano Prodi commented in a speech at the Institute d’Etudes Politiques in Paris (May 29, 2001), “lay in translating extremely high political ambitions . . . into a series of more specific, almost technical decisions. This indirect approach made further action possible. Rapprochement took place gradually. From confrontation we moved to willingness to cooperate in the economic sphere and then on to integration.” This is what many Europeans believe they have to offer the world: not power, but the transcendence of power. The “essence” of the European Union, writes Everts, is “all about subjecting inter-state relations to the rule of law,” and Europe’s experience of successful multilateral governance has in turn produced an ambition to convert the world. Europe “has a role to play in world ‘governance,’” says Prodi, a role based on replicating the European experience on a global scale. In Europe “the rule of law has replaced the crude interplay of power . . . power politics have lost their influence.” And by “making a success of integration we are demonstrating to the world that it is possible to create a method for peace.”

No doubt there are Britons, Germans, French, and others who would frown on such exuberant idealism. But many Europeans, including many in positions of power, routinely apply Europe’s experience to the rest of the world. For is not the general European critique of the American approach to “rogue” regimes based on this special European insight? Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Libya — these states may be dangerous and unpleasant, even evil. But might not an “indirect approach” work again, as it did in Europe? Might it not be possible once more to move from confrontation to rapprochement, beginning with cooperation in the economic sphere and then moving on to peaceful integration? Could not the formula that worked in Europe work again with Iran or even Iraq? A great many Europeans insist that it can.

The transmission of the European miracle to the rest of the world has become Europe’s new mission civilisatrice. Just as Americans have always believed that they had discovered the secret to human happiness and wished to export it to the rest of the world, so the Europeans have a new mission born of their own discovery of perpetual peace.

Thus we arrive at what may be the most important reason for the divergence in views between Europe and the United States. America’s power, and its willingness to exercise that power — unilaterally if necessary — represents a threat to Europe’s new sense of mission. Perhaps the greatest threat. American policymakers find it hard to believe, but leading officials and politicians in Europe worry more about how the United States might handle or mishandle the problem of Iraq — by undertaking unilateral and extralegal military action — than they worry about Iraq itself and Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction. And while it is true that they fear such action might destabilize the Middle East and lead to the unnecessary loss of life, there is a deeper concern.7 Such American action represents an assault on the essence of “postmodern” Europe. It is an assault on Europe’s new ideals, a denial of their universal validity, much as the monarchies of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe were an assault on American republican ideals. Americans ought to be the first to understand that a threat to one’s beliefs can be as frightening as a threat to one’s physical security.

As Americans have for two centuries, Europeans speak with great confidence of the superiority of their global understanding, the wisdom they have to offer other nations about conflict resolution, and their way of addressing international problems. But just as in the first decade of the American republic, there is a hint of insecurity in the European claim to “success,” an evident need to have their success affirmed and their views accepted by other nations, particularly by the mighty United States. After all, to deny the validity of the new European idealism is to raise profound doubts about the viability of the European project. If international problems cannot, in fact, be settled the European way, wouldn’t that suggest that Europe itself may eventually fall short of a solution, with all the horrors this implies?

And, of course, it is precisely this fear that still hangs over Europeans, even as Europe moves forward. Europeans, and particularly the French and Germans, are not entirely sure that the problem once known as the “German problem” really has been solved. As their various and often very different proposals for the future constitution of Europe suggest, the French are still not confident they can trust the Germans, and the Germans are still not sure they can trust themselves. This fear can at times hinder progress toward deeper integration, but it also propels the European project forward despite innumerable obstacles. The European project must succeed, for how else to overcome what Fischer, in his Humboldt University speech, called “the risks and temptations objectively inherent in Germany’s dimensions and central situation”? Those historic German “temptations” play at the back of many a European mind. And every time Europe contemplates the use of military force, or is forced to do so by the United States, there is no avoiding at least momentary consideration of what effect such a military action might have on the “German question.”

Perhaps it is not just coincidence that the amazing progress toward European integration in recent years has been accompanied not by the emergence of a European superpower but, on the contrary, by a diminishing of European military capabilities relative to the United States. Turning Europe into a global superpower capable of balancing the power of the United States may have been one of the original selling points of the European Union — an independent European foreign and defense policy was supposed to be one of the most important byproducts of European integration. But, in truth, the ambition for European “power” is something of an anachronism. It is an atavistic impulse, inconsistent with the ideals of postmodern Europe, whose very existence depends on the rejection of power politics. Whatever its architects may have intended, European integration has proved to be the enemy of European military power and, indeed, of an important European global role.

This phenomenon has manifested itself not only in flat or declining European defense budgets, but in other ways, too, even in the realm of “soft” power. European leaders talk of Europe’s essential role in the world. Prodi yearns “to make our voice heard, to make our actions count.” And it is true that Europeans spend a great deal of money on foreign aid — more per capita, they like to point out, than does the United States. Europeans engage in overseas military missions, so long as the missions are mostly limited to peacekeeping. But while the eu periodically dips its fingers into troubled international waters in the Middle East or the Korean Peninsula, the truth is that eu foreign policy is probably the most anemic of all the products of European integration. As Charles Grant, a sympathetic observer of the eu, recently noted, few European leaders “are giving it much time or energy.”8 eu foreign policy initiatives tend to be short-lived and are rarely backed by sustained agreement on the part of the various European powers. That is one reason they are so easily rebuffed, as was the case in late March when Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon blocked eu foreign policy chief Javier Solana from meeting with Yasser Arafat (only to turn around the next day and allow a much lower-ranking American negotiator to meet with the Palestinian leader).

It is obvious, moreover, that issues outside of Europe don’t attract nearly as much interest among Europeans as purely European issues do. This has surprised and frustrated Americans on all sides of the political and strategic debate: Recall the profound disappointment of American liberals when Europeans failed to mount an effective protest against Bush’s withdrawal from the abm treaty. But given the enormous and difficult agenda of integration, this European tendency to look inward is understandable. eu enlargement, the revision of the common economic and agricultural policies, the question of national sovereignty versus supranational governance, the so-called democracy deficit, the jostling of the large European powers, the dissatisfaction of the smaller powers, the establishment of a new European constitution — all of these present serious and unavoidable challenges. The difficulties of moving forward might seem insuperable were it not for the progress the project of European integration has already demonstrated.

American policies that are unwelcome on substance — on a missile defense system and the abm treaty, belligerence toward Iraq, support for Israel — are all the more unwelcome because for Europe, they are a distraction. Europeans often point to American insularity and parochialism. But Europeans themselves have turned intensely introspective. As Dominique Moisi noted in the Financial Times (March 11, 2002), the recent French presidential campaign saw “no reference . . . to the events of September 11 and their far-reaching consequences.” No one asked, “What should be the role of France and Europe in the new configuration of forces created after September 11? How should France reappraise its military budget and doctrine to take account of the need to maintain some kind of parity between Europe and the United States, or at least between France and the uk?” The Middle East conflict became an issue in the campaign because of France’s large Arab and Muslim population, as the high vote for Le Pen demonstrated. But Le Pen is not a foreign policy hawk. And as Moisi noted, “for most French voters in 2002, security has little to do with abstract and distant geopolitics. Rather, it is a question of which politician can best protect them from the crime and violence plaguing the streets and suburbs of their cities.”

Can Europe change course and assume a larger role on the world stage? There has been no shortage of European leaders urging it to do so. Nor is the weakness of eu foreign policy today necessarily proof that it must be weak tomorrow, given the eu’s record of overcoming weaknesses in other areas. And yet the political will to demand more power for Europe appears to be lacking, and for the very good reason that Europe does not see a mission for itself that requires power. Its mission is to oppose power. It is revealing that the argument most often advanced by Europeans for augmenting their military strength these days is not that it will allow Europe to expand its strategic purview. It is merely to rein in and “multilateralize” the United States. “America,” writes the pro-American British scholar Timothy Garton Ash in the New York Times (April 9, 2002), “has too much power for anyone’s good, including its own.” Therefore Europe must amass power, but for no other reason than to save the world and the United States from the dangers inherent in the present lopsided situation.

Whether that particular mission is a worthy one or not, it seems unlikely to rouse European passions. Even Védrine has stopped talking about counterbalancing the United States. Now he shrugs and declares there “is no reason for the Europeans to match a country that can fight four wars at once.” It was one thing for Europe in the 1990s to increase its collective expenditures on defense from $150 billion per year to $180 billion when the United States was spending $280 billion per year. But now the United States is heading toward spending as much as $500 billion per year, and Europe has not the slightest intention of keeping up. European analysts lament the continent’s “strategic irrelevance.” nato Secretary General George Robertson has taken to calling Europe a “military pygmy” in an effort to shame Europeans into spending more and doing so more wisely. But who honestly believes Europeans will fundamentally change their way of doing business? They have many reasons not to.

The U.S. response

n thinking about the divergence of their own views and Europeans’, Americans must not lose sight of the main point: The new Europe is indeed a blessed miracle and a reason for enormous celebration — on both sides of the Atlantic. For Europeans, it is the realization of a long and improbable dream: a continent free from nationalist strife and blood feuds, from military competition and arms races. War between the major European powers is almost unimaginable. After centuries of misery, not only for Europeans but also for those pulled into their conflicts — as Americans were twice in the past century — the new Europe really has emerged as a paradise. It is something to be cherished and guarded, not least by Americans, who have shed blood on Europe’s soil and would shed more should the new Europe ever fail.

Nor should we forget that the Europe of today is very much the product of American foreign policy stretching back over six decades. European integration was an American project, too, after World War II. And so, recall, was European weakness. When the Cold War dawned, Americans such as Dean Acheson hoped to create in Europe a powerful partner against the Soviet Union. But that was not the only American vision of Europe underlying U.S. policies during the twentieth century. Predating it was Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s vision of a Europe that had been rendered, in effect, strategically irrelevant. As the historian John Lamberton Harper has put it, he wanted “to bring about a radical reduction in the weight of Europe” and thereby make possible “the retirement of Europe from world politics.”9

Americans who came of age during the Cold War have always thought of Europe almost exclusively in Achesonian terms — as the essential bulwark of freedom in the struggle against Soviet tyranny. But Americans of Roosevelt’s era had a different view. In the late 1930s the common conviction of Americans was that “the European system was basically rotten, that war was endemic on that continent, and the Europeans had only themselves to blame for their plight.”10 By the early 1940s Europe appeared to be nothing more than the overheated incubator of world wars that cost America dearly. During World War II Americans like Roosevelt, looking backward rather than forward, believed no greater service could be performed than to take Europe out of the global strategic picture once and for all. “After Germany is disarmed,” fdr pointedly asked, “what is the reason for France having a big military establishment?” Charles DeGaulle found such questions “disquieting for Europe and for France.” Even though the United States pursued Acheson’s vision during the Cold War, there was always a part of American policy that reflected Roosevelt’s vision, too. Eisenhower undermining Britain and France at Suez was only the most blatant of many American efforts to cut Europe down to size and reduce its already weakened global influence.

But the more important American contribution to Europe’s current world-apart status stemmed not from anti-European but from pro-European impulses. It was a commitment to Europe, not hostility to Europe, that led the United States in the immediate postwar years to keep troops on the continent and to create nato. The presence of American forces as a security guarantee in Europe was, as it was intended to be, the critical ingredient to begin the process of European integration.

Europe’s evolution to its present state occurred under the mantle of the U.S. security guarantee and could not have occurred without it. Not only did the United States for almost half a century supply a shield against such external threats as the Soviet Union and such internal threats as may have been posed by ethnic conflict in places like the Balkans. More important, the United States was the key to the solution of the German problem and perhaps still is. Germany’s Fischer, in the Humboldt University speech, noted two “historic decisions” that made the new Europe possible: “the usa’s decision to stay in Europe” and “France’s and Germany’s commitment to the principle of integration, beginning with economic links.” But of course the latter could never have occurred without the former. France’s willingness to risk the reintegration of Germany into Europe — and France was, to say the least, highly dubious — depended on the promise of continued American involvement in Europe as a guarantee against any resurgence of German militarism. Nor were postwar Germans unaware that their own future in Europe depended on the calming presence of the American military.

The United States, in short, solved the Kantian paradox for the Europeans. Kant had argued that the only solution to the immoral horrors of the Hobbesian world was the creation of a world government. But he also feared that the “state of universal peace” made possible by world government would be an even greater threat to human freedom than the Hobbesian international order, inasmuch as such a government, with its monopoly of power, would become “the most horrible despotism.”11 How nations could achieve perpetual peace without destroying human freedom was a problem Kant could not solve. But for Europe the problem was solved by the United States. By providing security from outside, the United States has rendered it unnecessary for Europe’s supranational government to provide it. Europeans did not need power to achieve peace and they do not need power to preserve it.

The current situation abounds in ironies. Europe’s rejection of power politics, its devaluing of military force as a tool of international relations, have depended on the presence of American military forces on European soil. Europe’s new Kantian order could flourish only under the umbrella of American power exercised according to the rules of the old Hobbesian order. American power made it possible for Europeans to believe that power was no longer important. And now, in the final irony, the fact that United States military power has solved the European problem, especially the “German problem,” allows Europeans today to believe that American military power, and the “strategic culture” that has created and sustained it, are outmoded and dangerous.

Most Europeans do not see the great paradox: that their passage into post-history has depended on the United States not making the same passage. Because Europe has neither the will nor the ability to guard its own paradise and keep it from being overrun, spiritually as well as physically, by a world that has yet to accept the rule of “moral consciousness,” it has become dependent on America’s willingness to use its military might to deter or defeat those around the world who still believe in power politics.

Some Europeans do understand the conundrum. Some Britons, not surprisingly, understand it best. Thus Robert Cooper writes of the need to address the hard truth that although “within the postmodern world [i.e., the Europe of today], there are no security threats in the traditional sense,” nevertheless, throughout the rest of the world — what Cooper calls the “modern and pre-modern zones” — threats abound. If the postmodern world does not protect itself, it can be destroyed. But how does Europe protect itself without discarding the very ideals and principles that undergird its pacific system?

“The challenge to the postmodern world,” Cooper argues, “is to get used to the idea of double standards.” Among themselves, Europeans may “operate on the basis of laws and open cooperative security.” But when dealing with the world outside Europe, “we need to revert to the rougher methods of an earlier era — force, preemptive attack, deception, whatever is necessary.” This is Cooper’s principle for safeguarding society: “Among ourselves, we keep the law but when we are operating in the jungle, we must also use the laws of the jungle.”

Cooper’s argument is directed at Europe, and it is appropriately coupled with a call for Europeans to cease neglecting their defenses, “both physical and psychological.” But what Cooper really describes is not Europe’s future but America’s present. For it is the United States that has had the difficult task of navigating between these two worlds, trying to abide by, defend, and further the laws of advanced civilized society while simultaneously employing military force against those who refuse to abide by those rules. The United States is already operating according to Cooper’s double standard, and for the very reasons he suggests. American leaders, too, believe that global security and a liberal order — as well as Europe’s “postmodern” paradise — cannot long survive unless the United States does use its power in the dangerous, Hobbesian world that still flourishes outside Europe.

What this means is that although the United States has played the critical role in bringing Europe into this Kantian paradise, and still plays a key role in making that paradise possible, it cannot enter this paradise itself. It mans the walls but cannot walk through the gate. The United States, with all its vast power, remains stuck in history, left to deal with the Saddams and the ayatollahs, the Kim Jong Ils and the Jiang Zemins, leaving the happy benefits to others.

An acceptable division?

s this situation tolerable for the United States? In many ways, it is. Contrary to what many believe, the United States can shoulder the burden of maintaining global security without much help from Europe. The United States spends a little over 3 percent of its gdp on defense today. Were Americans to increase that to 4 percent — meaning a defense budget in excess of $500 billion per year — it would still represent a smaller percentage of national wealth than Americans spent on defense throughout most of the past half-century. Even Paul Kennedy, who invented the term “imperial overstretch” in the late 1980s (when the United States was spending around 7 percent of its gdp on defense), believes the United States can sustain its current military spending levels and its current global dominance far into the future. Can the United States handle the rest of the world without much help from Europe? The answer is that it already does. The United States has maintained strategic stability in Asia with no help from Europe. In the Gulf War, European help was token; so it has been more recently in Afghanistan, where Europeans are once again “doing the dishes”; and so it would be in an invasion of Iraq to unseat Saddam. Europe has had little to offer the United States in strategic military terms since the end of the Cold War — except, of course, that most valuable of strategic assets, a Europe at peace.

The United States can manage, therefore, at least in material terms. Nor can one argue that the American people are unwilling to shoulder this global burden, since they have done so for a decade already. After September 11, they seem willing to continue doing so for a long time to come. Americans apparently feel no resentment at not being able to enter a “postmodern” utopia. There is no evidence most Americans desire to. Partly because they are so powerful, they take pride in their nation’s military power and their nation’s special role in the world.

Americans have no experience that would lead them to embrace fully the ideals and principles that now animate Europe. Indeed, Americans derive their understanding of the world from a very different set of experiences. In the first half of the twentieth century, Americans had a flirtation with a certain kind of internationalist idealism. Wilson’s “war to end all wars” was followed a decade later by an American secretary of state putting his signature to a treaty outlawing war. fdr in the 1930s put his faith in non-aggression pacts and asked merely that Hitler promise not to attack a list of countries Roosevelt presented to him. But then came Munich and

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Post by Michael » July 29th, 2005, 4:32 am

Doreen, if this is too long, you can delete it – not! ;)

Ziatko, Kagan’s essay is, indeed, long. I read it carefully and find that it certainly does project, no pun intended, the collective mentality of the PNAC.

I hear Rummy’s tired references to “new Europe” vs. “old Europe” in the essay.

There is an arrogance in claiming that America’s presence in Europe enabled this European utopia and, in fact, sustains it. That Germany might again rise up and become a military nemesis to the rest of Europe were it not for the presence of US bases is theory at best.

Perhaps the Germans, indeed all of Europe, had become weary of constant warfare, the loss of friends and family and Germany had finally resigned itself to the obvious fact that its ethnicity made it no better or worse than that of other peoples.

The annexation of East Germany into the Warsaw pact and, consequently, the Soviet Union may have also taken its toll on the citizens of Germany. A good question might be was Germany less of a threat to rise again because of America’s military presence on the continent or because the nation had been halved? Kagan, as would be expected of the PNAC, gives far too much credit to the US.

The essay, of course, condones preemptive strikes against “rogue states” and “threatening nations”. The main reason given for this is merely that the US has the military might to do it. It has the military might to fight “four wars at once”.

There is a great deal of irrational content contained in what reads like a well thought out, intelligent essay. Actually, I believe this essay was very well thought out, as so much of The Regime’s reasoning for its actions is. How else can it carry out its actions if not to justify them through skewed “logic” which always produces the “correct answer”?

The claim that the US was once weak because it was young and was threatened by European empires misses quite a few points.

This claim might hold water if, during all of that time, there was air travel that European empires could use to support their so called military might. However, America was, indeed, protected by two seas. In order for Europeans or Asians to attack the US, they had to travel great distances by ship. This mode of travel took a long time and any invading force, as the British Empire discovered during The American Revolution, would come to the realization that attacking the US in such a manner not only would drain its military of the urgency of its acrimony and sense of mission but, undoubtedly, would drain its fighting force physically as well.

Additionally, Kagan misses a point, a condition which the US has faced, without success. When and if invaders landed on American soil for the purpose of preemptively striking the US, they would find a fighting force, or more accurately, fighting forces who were intimately familiar with their surroundings. As the US found in Vietnam and is all too sadly finding in The Middle East, there’s a lot to be said about home field advantage, especially when the home field is replete with jungles or mountains or other such person unfriendly conditions.

America may have sought peace and a desire to work with the international community at one time, but it did so with much consideration for the technology of the time. There were not “smart bombs” and the threat of nuclear annihilation hadn’t yet surfaced.

Ziatco, I’m glad that you posted this essay so that people can see the kind justification that the PNAC and, consequently, The Regime uses for the imminent and inevitable necessity that America police the world, especially since it's in such an enviable position of power.

What strikes me most of all about this essay and almost all of what emanates from the PNAC and The Regime is the detachment of its descriptors.

They speak, as do high ranking military officers, in Orwellian military strategic terms and phrases.

They speak of military budgets as part of the GDP.

They speak of Americans taking pride in “their military power”.

They speak of shouldering a “global burden”.

They speak of “military assets”.

The huge irony, the elephant in the room type irony that Kagan omits is that all of the reference to military strategy and maintaining security for the rest of the world, especially idealistic and weak Europe, is being done by many men who’ve never donned the uniform of the US or any other military. Even those that may have served in the military did so under the best of conditions whether it was circumstantial or provided by their lots in life.

They reference war and protection without referencing humanity.

Yes, Americans are probably proud of their military, but I just don’t believe that the majority are proud of their nation’s power. I have no statistics other than those that show Americans are tiring of the Iraq tragedy, but I believe that they would rather use that military and that power for truly defensive purposes, literally stopping a known eminent threat such as Khrushchev was when he threatened to “bury” us. That was an undeniable direct threat from what the US considered a major adversary, an adversary we had no doubt possessed weapons of mass destruction. Yet, even with the direct thread and knowledge of weapons of mass destruction, we didn’t preemptively strike The Soviet Union.

It certainly would be incongruous to use as an excuse that we didn’t preemptively strike The USSR because we feared a retaliation with weapons of mass destruction, would it not? After all, that was the reason given for preemptively striking Iraq. The Regime would have us believe in its lead up to war that Saddam (it’s always easier to demonize a person than a nation – remember Goldstien in “1984") possessed technologically advanced weapons that could be “launched within 45 minutes”. He possessed drones which could deliver biological and chemical agents en masse to the US.

Obviously, then, the reluctance on our part to begin warfare against The USSR could not have been based upon that entity’s military capabilities.

All in all, the essay is the same unsubstantiated theoretical bullshit that The Regime uses to further any and all of its actions.

September 11, of course, is used frequently as a reminder of why we invaded Iraq. The president reminded us again on the 28th of June.

We invaded Iraq “because we were attacked”, he said. With as much support that the PNAC gives for preemptive attacks by the US upon any nation or group that is a threat or, according to the Bush Doctrine, may someday become a threat to interfere with “American interests” anywhere in the world, one would think that Bush wouldn’t have had to say that we invaded Iraq “because we were attacked”.

Saddam may have said that Iraq would be victorious if attacked by the US, and it may have been had it possessed the kind of WMD that The Regime would have us believe it did, but I don’t believe that he ever threatened to attack, or bury the US as Khrushchev threatened to do. He did not outright claim, as Khrushchev did, that he was a threat to the US.

He was not even involved in the events of September 11, 2001.

Who was involved, however, was the Bush administration.

First of all, as jim implied, many people think that it’s over the line to even suggest that our own president would do such a thing.

Imagine that a crime is committed and you are, because of who you are or what position you hold, immediately and automatically absolved of any suspicion. Imagine the wonderful crimes you could carry out with impunity. What an enviable position in which any criminal could find himself.

The fact that Bush isn’t intelligent enough to pull off September 11 is irrelevant, although I personally believe that when it comes to those things which are self serving for Bush, he can be just as devious as the next criminal.

However, that fact is irrelevant because he doesn’t run the show. The neoconservative group runs the show. Bush is nothing more than a front man. And as devious as I believe he can be, I also believe that The Regime chose the class clown as a front man. He may be devious, but he’s not real smart about it.

This is why Professor Griffin and others were able to find so much evidence that The Regime was, indeed, behind the events of September 11.

For anyone who harbors any doubt that The Regime played a major role in effectuating the events of 9/11, my challenge would be to read both of Griffin’s books.

If after reading those books anyone can rationally and definitively disprove even half of the anomalies exposed by Griffin and others about that project, I’d be very surprised.

First, of course, a person would need to read the books.

Secondly, I’ve had people who’ve read or heard bits and pieces about the “conspiracy theory” rebut the theory with such remarks as “well maybe most of those flights were only partially full on a regular basis” or “maybe Bush was just trying to display an aura of calm so as to not frighten the American people”.

Those are not rebuttals. They are merely alternate “theories” that have not been supported by evidence, not even circumstantial evidence. Explaining why something happened on 9/11/01 with “well, maybe this or maybe that” is, at best, a very weak refutation.

Read the books. Explain the anomalies. Answer the questions and present evidence that refutes the “conspiracy theorists’” evidence and then you can say that, no, Bush would never do such a thing, not even to justify a war that he was determined to have fought by other people’s loved ones, but couldn’t justify any other way than to stage a “new Pearl Harbor”.

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Post by jimboloco » July 29th, 2005, 9:43 am

Well, shit, I just erased with a fell sweeping spasm my lengthy response.

I was indoctrinated with the Ziggi Zaggy type essay through 4 years of AFROTC at university, excused from government class, given a green light to conform and go forward in service of defending democracy and freedumb.

"Peace is our profession" is painted on every B-52.

Might makes for benevolent American power and weakness makes for subtle Europoean diplomacy.

Easy enough to take if you are making a lot of money off Lockheed or your retirement pension depends upon following orders.

But enough folks start seeing how that power is limited and draining us, maybe we'll see a change.

We are the cowboys and the Europeans are the saloonkeepers?

Why would the gunman go for the sherrif when the saloonkeeper has all the money, unless the outlaw perceives the sherrif as a threat to his getting to the saloonkeeper.

I wonder how often in the old west, the outlaws directly attacked the sherrif first, then went for the saloonkeeper>

It's easy to rationalise power.

How about listing some of Griffith's essential points of contention that the neo-cons were in collusion with Al-Qaida?

The Eurpoeans are skilled at police work, where we need to be, and thay also recognise that there are limits to huge military forces, something that the American people are not willing to consider. Our culture is too deeply ingrained with the belief that we are the greatest, a disbelief that we could be anything less.

ZigZag states that the US maintains strategic ability in Asia without the help of the rest of the world.

Bunk. We have no real strategic ability, it is concentrated into the oil-rich MiddleEast with doubtful efficacy.

In police matters, we do have international collusion, but in military affairs, we are both relatively alone and ineffectual.

Never mind about the CIA.
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Post by Zlatko Waterman » July 29th, 2005, 12:25 pm

Dear Michael:

Thank you for your thoughtful and thorough analysis of some of Kagan's arrogant and fundamentally brutal notions. Also, thank you for "hosting" that huge diatribe, which somehow weirdly got cut off at the end, even though the preview showed it whole on my screen.

I am reminded of Whitman:

" . . .what is cut off
drops horribly into a pail . . ."

Certainly some of Kagan ought to be lopped off and dropped into a pail.

"Might makes right" ( and right-wing . . .) isn't used as either a slogan for battle or as a caveat much today, but Kagan argues pretty much along that line.

I am old enough to remember "Impeach Earl Warren" bumper stickers, along with "Support Your Local Police", code in a bumper sticker for "Support the Vietnam War and Crack the Head of Anyone Who Marches in Protest." ... warren.htm

Here's a site with a dose of lunacy-- you can still buy "Support Your Local Police" bumper stickers here:

( my favorite insanity here is NUKE THEIR ASS-- TAKE THEIR GAS).

And-- a personal note:

As my wife and I take our nightly walk for exercise, we circle a large, several-block-in-size square. Along the way we pass a house with open windows in front, and an interesting, almost Nathaniel Hawthorne-like spectacle.

Inside the house, in a brightly lit room, gather seven or eight senior men-- all over 65. They press up toward a central upright piano, where one of them pounds out simple chords while they sing ( in rough harmony) old Protestant hymns.

Nothing wrong with that, of course, an amusing Saturday Evening Post cover from 1950.

But outside, all over the parked vehicles that brought the hymn-singers to practice, are vehicles ( mostly huge SUVs-- including Hummers, whose bumpers bear stickers like):


and SEND ME ( hilarious for a sixty-five-year-old real estate broker!)



And so goes my neighborhood.

The house is owned by an angelic- looking grandfatherly type with white hair about seventy-five with whom we exchange pleasantries when we walk by and he's out watering his yard.

I refuse to walk on his side of the street, though. He has an eight-foot-wide American flag waving in his yard, attached to a flagpole with a golden eagle on its top.

Reminds me of being in an airport a few years back when some uniformed flight crew ( including, I'm sure, some pilots) walked past me with fancy personal valises emblazoned with wide bumper stickers glued to the vinyl:


Just a swatch of Americana, and Californiana, for you, Michael and all.

Remember, this state ( not I, personally) "Joined Arnold."

Defiantly, and grateful for Michael, and Jim's commentary,

The "Z"

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Post by jimboloco » July 29th, 2005, 1:00 pm

Jane Fonda is going on a national bus tour to protest the Vietnam War. The news was posted in USA Today, whose editor or publisher is also against the war.

Jane has guts, I'll tell you that.

Anybody know where I can get a bumper sticker that states:


I would post that one on my rear bumper.

I wonder if I can get paper with adhesive peel-off backing that I could insert into my printer?


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Post by mnaz » August 4th, 2005, 4:55 pm

Thanks, Michael and Zlatko, for these insights.

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Post by stilltrucking » August 5th, 2005, 10:38 pm

circumstantial evidence that’s already surfaced is the fact that Israel’s Treasury Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was supposed to attend a meeting.
Of course the old butterfly effect,
Did you know there is circumstantial evidence that the holocaust never took place?
Yes yes let us blame it on the Jews.

I don't understand the need for circumstantial evidence; there are fingerprints all over the place. Eye witnesses.

I wasn't sure what it was I had to google
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE - Circumstantial evidence is best explained by saying what it is not - it is not direct evidence from a witness who saw or heard something. Circumstantial evidence is a fact that can be used to infer another fact.
Michael please pardon my paranoia, I have checked out a lot of sites that make good arguments about conspiracies and bush, but some of are just plane wacko. Do you think Trafficant is an American hero framed by the FBI? I
One site listed all the members on the Council on Foreign Relations, The Tri-Lateral Commission, and the Bildenbergers, some of the names had Asterisk after them, those were the Jews.

I live in a cloud of false beliefs

Good luck with your letter, I hope it does some good. I myself would like to deliver a delicious, home baked banana cream pie, right into his smirking face. Is it against the law to say that?

How come nobody can find any leaks on the secrete energy commision that dirty dick hosted with Kenny Boy Lay and the rest of the boys? We are in Iraq, and I don't think Hillary or anybody else is going to get us out. I been hoping for a dirty little scandal that balloons into watergate, but those republicans with any kind of integrity are extinct.

My favorite circumstantial evidence is the night Hinkley shot Reagan his father was having dinner with Bush Sr.

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Post by jimboloco » August 24th, 2005, 10:25 am

well on further contemplation, without reading your conspiracy theory book references, I have come to the :idea: than maybe infaact the higher ups did infact know what was unfolding, in otherwords they knew about the AlQaida plot and infact let it happen......we do know now that the ringleader asshole Mohammed Atta was known as were several others, they were monitered somewhat, they were known to be inside america, what I'd like to know is how much was already known about them. the supposedly unconcerned behavior and bu·reau·crat·ic
cul de sucks that "prevented" closer scrutiny of these maybe it was a passive-aggressive covert-ops.

Yes I can believe that. The 9-11 attacks could have been prevented but were not, maybe so.
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Post by stilltrucking » August 25th, 2005, 5:41 pm

United States an "imperialistic" country."

Imperialistic country. What would ever lead someone to call the Good Ole US that?


The 11 invasions of Mexico starting in 1914
Haiti in 1915
The Dominican Republic in 1916
Cuba - 1917
Panama - 1918
Russia 1917-1920

Iran - 1953
Guatemala - 1954
Lebanon - 1957
Zaire (congo) - 1961
Chile - 1973

This is just a simplistic list. The US government admits all of these
I like that list a lot. But I would like to remind you that you can not name one “trouble spot" in the Middle East today that does not go back to European imperialism and the treaty of Versailles. That is why I wanted to barf when I heard Bush’s state of the union speech called Wilsonian. But you are right Michael it is the United States and the Jewish conspiracy that is responsible for the entire situation. (As you have pointed out no Jews were killed in the 9/11 attack.)

On an unrelated note the personal records of over thirty thousand Air Force officers has been stolen from Randolph Air Force base. That is half the officer core. Nothing to do with anything I suppose. But I have a paranoid fantasy that the info could be used to infiltrate command and control of nuclear weapons. Then there are the over eighty thousand gang members in the US who are potential terrorists. Just thinking about Padilla ... e-padilla/
But as stupid as it sounds I think Bush in some insane way has spared the US any terrorist attack these past four years if only because things are going so well for them. Why should they attack us now? Am I the only one who believes that another attack is inevitable? If for no other reasan than to help get his brother elected.

You make me nervous as hell dude, so does jimbo. But I know you all are not anti-Semitic. Some of your best friends are probably Jews.
The JEWS who Run Bush and the USA
Christian Zionists Heralded in Israel

And now I like Ike a lot more than I used to.
Ike Forces Israel to Withdraw
President Dwight Eisenhower was upset by the fact that Israel, France and Great Britain had secretly planned the campaign to evict Egypt from the Suez Canal. Israel's failure to inform the United States of its intentions, combined with ignoring American entreaties not to go to war, sparked tensions between the countries. The United States subsequently joined the Soviet Union (ironically, just after the Soviets invaded Hungary) in a campaign to force Israel to withdraw. This included a threat to discontinue all U.S. assistance, UN sanctions and expulsion from the UN (see exchanges between Ben-Gurion and Eisenhower).

U.S. pressure resulted in an Israeli withdrawal from the areas it conquered without obtaining any concessions from the Egyptians. This sowed the seeds of the 1967 war.

One reason Israel did give in to Eisenhower was the assurance he gave to Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion. Before evacuating Sharm al-Sheikh, the strategic point guarding the Straits of Tiran, Israel elicited a promise that the United States would maintain the freedom of navigation in the waterway. In addition, Washington sponsored a UN resolution creating the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) to supervise the territories vacated by the Israeli forces.

The war temporarily ended the activities of the fedayeen; however, they were renewed a few years by a loosely knit group of terrorist organizations that became know as the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). ... z_War.html
It does not help Israel to sentimentalize her. No body here gives a fuk about the USS Liberty. No one anywhere does. But if you go to any Jew hating holocaust denying web site you are sure to find a link to it. Israel with her back against the sea is desperate for any friends she can find. I don’t blame her. But she has never had a better friend then the United States. It is a shame what she did to that ship. Clay remembers the Alamo, I remember the USS Liberty. But it doesn’t matter anymore. That is just history.
Christian Zionism
We love you!" Sharon told the gathering. In a march through the streets of Jerusalem, they returned the affection, waving signs such as "Oklahoma Loves Israel" and shouting "Hallelujah to the God of Israel!"

The same month, several thousand evangelical Christians flocked to Washington to participate in a "Christian Solidarity for Israel" rally sponsored by the Christian Coalition.

Just days later, about 16,000 U.S. churches, many of them in the South, participated in a one-day "Stand for Israel" prayer campaign co-chaired by Ralph Reed, who formerly headed the Christian Coalition and is now the Atlanta-based head of the Bush-Cheney re-election campaign in the South.

The swelling support of evangelical Christians has paid political dividends for Israel --- so much so that creation of a special parliamentary committee to steer Israel's relationship with them is under consideration.
There was one of those Christian Zionists rallies in San Antone this year. None of the local rabbis in san antone wanted anything to do with it. I was so proud of them.

It does not help Israel to sentimentalize her. No body here gives a fuk about the USS Liberty. No one anywhere does. But if you go to any Jew hating holocaust denying web site you are sure to find a link to it. Israel with her back against the sea is desperate for any friends she can find. I don’t blame her. But she has never had a better friend then the United States. It is a shame what she did to that ship. Clay remembers the Alamo, I remember the USS Liberty. But it doesn’t matter anymore. That is just history.

I cannot forget that it was Sharon and his official visit to the Temple Mount four years ago that started this latest wave of violence.

And Zlatko I remember that little hoax about the impending plans for nuclear war. I enjoyed that a lot. But I remember pointing out to you that some of the references in there were to out and out anti Semitic websites. And you said yes there was a little tinge of anti-Semitism there. Nothing for a white boy like you to worry about. I wonder where your parents are buried? Have their tombstones been desecrated by a little tinge group of anti Semites?

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Post by Zlatko Waterman » August 25th, 2005, 7:50 pm

Dear Still:

Shalom. and peace, brother.

I think I said "stealth anti-semitism", and didn't mean for "tinge" to receive emphasis, if I used that word, which I don't believe I did:

Quote from original "Nuke Iran post":


"No doubt there is some stealth anti-semitism buried in some of this commentary."

. I meant to imply that the anti-semitism was thinly disguised, not to imply a measurement of its intensity. I think you will find that I wrote "stealth" as a way to suggest a hidden anti-semitic argument .

But if I seemed to imply that anti-semitism at the links I provided was insignificant, I apologize.

Christianity IS Judaism, with the addition of the Marvel comics superhero J.C. of Nazareth ( himself a Jew, as Leopold Bloom points out in Joyce's "Ulysses"--)

"YOUR GOD!", Bloom shouts.

In 1990 I led a class in Catholic catechism. One of the things the instructor (not me-- I was only a "leader"-- the class was taught by a very scholarly Catholic sister . . .) asked us to do was find ways in which Judaism and Christianity differ. Aside from the Christian propensity to name and elaborate on the messiah, one is hard-pressed to find that many fundamental differences. I mean, apart from doctrinal differences, of course.

Enlightened compassion-- " Do unto others . . ." is the heart of most major religious law, after all.

No, no one has desecrated my ancestors' graves.

And some of my best friends are Jews. And some of my literary characters, too. And my father, who was an anti-semite, inveighed against the Jews. So, to vex him, at the age of 18, I informed him I planned to become a rabbi, and promptly got myself a Jewish girlfriend, first, Sarah Cohen, and then Nina Silverstein.

With these young ladies I went to Temple regularly, and have never felt welcomed in any religious community to the same extent until I worked for the Roman Catholic church in 1990.

But the synagogue folks were just as kind.

Try this list: ... an-writers

It contains some of the most important people to have influenced my own art and writing, these sixty years. Art Spiegelman is one of the most important influences on my ( and millions of other artists') comix. And Spiegelman is most famous for his work on the Holocaust, "Maus."

But I shall stop before I "protest too much", as Bill the Shake says.

Suffice it to say for now that the only reason I am not a converted Jew is that I have snakeskinned off all instituional religion at the moment.

My ex-colleague and close friend, Simon Waltzer ( a citizen of Israel and New Zealand, but a professor in the US and part of my old English department) who attended The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, has continual criticisms of Israel, and particularly of Sharon. Simon risked his life and sustained a serious back injury running over a mine with the armored PC he was commanding in the 1967 war, so he is also a patriot.

One of the traditions of Judaism I always liked most was feeling the freedom to argue with God. Both Moses and Abraham avail themselves of questioning Yahweh's imprecations.

And the heart of Judaism, as I have come to understand it, is interpretation, hermeneutics.

Here is a web site defining the pagan (Greek and other ancients), Hebrew and Christian traditions in outline form: ... ndium.html

(link to a compendious web site I read continually)

I apologize if it seemed to you I was recommending anti-semitic ravings. All anti-semitism is wrong.



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Post by stilltrucking » August 25th, 2005, 10:12 pm

I apologize to you. I knew you did not use the word tinge. That was bullshit on my part. Thinking about that little book "On Bullshit". If not for Nietzsche I would probably be standing on a street corner in NYC handing out pamphlets for Jews for Jesus. I suppose what distresses me most is how we allow other countries to drag us around by the ying yang, I still think Iran got Reagan elected the first time. I been thinking about that Roth quote a lot:

A Jew without Jews, without Judaism, without Zionism, without Jewishness, without a temple or an army or even a pistol, a Jew clearly without a home, just the object itself, like a glass or an apple. Philip Roth

I don’t know jack shit about Judaism, my father a stone cold Jew atheist would not let the women send me off to Hebrew school. If for nothing else I am grateful to him for that. No religious indoctrination at all, no bar mitzvah or anything else. But for all the talk about the mighty smighty patriarchal god, it is all matrilineal. Those women in my family loved that god of their mothers. Never could figure out why. Nietzsche saw Christianity as a Jewish plot to enslave the superman? He called the Jews a priestly people full of priestly resentment. God knows the women in my family were full of resentment. My earliest memories go back to world war two, the darkened room listening to the news from Europe. That put a patina of paranoia on me that I still have not escaped. That little bit in their about Netanyahu not going to the world trade center that day made the hairs on the back of my neck prickle. There was about eighty some Jews killed that day. Not sure if that is about right percentage out of three thousand people? I still remember the day the Rosenberg was executed, a squirmy feeling to be a Jew boy that summer. So conflicted about Israel, in the fifties all the Jewish kids I knew on the wrong side of the tracks thought the idea of taking up that dual citizenship was ridiculous. We knew there was no better place to be then the USA. But the socialist kibbutzes do appeal to me. My mother was born in a kibbutz in Woodbine New Jersey.
Founded by Baron de Hirsh

Image ... irsch.html

My own personal experience, too has led me to recognize that the Jews have very good ability in agriculture...and my efforts shall show that the Jews have not lost the agricultural qualities that their forefathers possessed. I shall try to make for them a new home in different lands, where as free farmers on their own soil, they can make themselves useful to that country." [/i]--Baron Maurice de Hirsch in The Forum (August 1891)

Hirsch was approached by Theodor Herzl to request his support for the Zionist movement, but he regarded the creation of a Jewish state as a fantasy and refused any assistance. At the same time, he had become convinced that Jews were fated to suffer as long as they remained in Eastern Europe. He believed that emigration to nations without a history of antisemitism, where Jews would be treated as equal citizens, would lead to both a physical and moral rebirth of Jewry.

I had a dream about St Leo’s in the Little Italy section of Baltimore last night. I had to walk past it everyday. Full of my bubbie’s old wives tails I was scared shitless of those nuns in the old fashioned habits. I wish I could be a Catholic, or a Hindu. Seems like a easy way out to me. Very conflicted. Everytime I see a picture of Bush wearing a yarmulke I get paranoid as hell. And when the World War 2 vets who were there and saw it with their own eyes when they die off, it will be a field day for revisionists. Strange times for me. I remember thinking of what happened to Germany. Raped in World War one, the shit hitting the fan was inevitable. I think it is misleading to think of WWI and WWII as two wars, just one war with an intermission to raise another generation of cannon fodder. Hell I got to go I should not even be here posting. But this place is irresistible to me. Fine minds, extrodinary people. I owe you an apology for twisting your words.

What worries most about Israel is the Masada complex.

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Correction 400 to 500 estimated

Post by stilltrucking » August 25th, 2005, 10:46 pm ... _or_Israel
It is estimated that between 400 and 500 Jews died in the attacks on
the World Trade Center on 9/11. The exact number is not known, since
official record-keeping does not list the religions of the victims.

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Post by jimboloco » August 26th, 2005, 12:22 am

a tree grows in brooklym
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