Many orthodox people speak as though it were the business of skeptics to disprove received dogmas rather than of dogmatists to prove them. This is, of course, a mistake. If I were to suggest that between the Earth and Mars there is a china teapot revolving about the sun in an elliptical orbit, nobody would be able to disprove my assertion provided I were careful to add that the teapot is too small to be revealed even by our most powerful telescopes. But if I were to go on to say that, since my assertion cannot be disproved, it is intolerable presumption on the part of human reason to doubt it, I should rightly be thought to be talking nonsense. If, however, the existence of such a teapot were affirmed in ancient books, taught as the sacred truth every Sunday, and instilled into the minds of children at school, hesitation to believe in its existence would become a mark of eccentricity and entitle the doubter to the attentions of the psychiatrist in an enlightened age or of the Inquisitor in an earlier time.
A few Christians claim the analogy is irrelevant, and typical of the Russellian or Dawkinsesque scoffer. (this is only one of many anti-theological arguments made by Russell, of course). While I think the xtians who object to the analogy are ultimately mistaken, they may have a point--yet that point holds only in regards to the somewhat whimsical quality of the language, not to the argument itself. Yes, it's a bit Lewis Carroll-like--regardless, the Teapot Analogy demonstrates the Ad Ignorantium type of argument of some theists (and even sophisticated theologians).
Here's one grumble about the Teapot analogy from a theist and fairly well-known conservative blogger, Billy the Maverick Philosopher:
http://maverickphilosopher.powerblogs.c ... 1433.shtml
Quote:
We believe Billy the Maverick Philosopher to be rather mistaken: and that his (S) formulation of the analogy is a rather powerful, and even scientific objection to any arguments for God, however whimsically stated (and instead of Teapot, one could instantiate Zeus, or flying spaghetti monster, or perhaps an incredibly powerful alien who resides in the Teapot).But the real appeal to atheists and agnostics of the Teapot passage rests on a third move Russell makes. He is clearly suggesting that belief in God (i.e., belief that God exists) is epistemically on a par with believing in a celestial teapot. Just as we have no reason to believe in celestial teapots, irate lunar unicorns (lunicorns?), flying spaghetti monsters, and the like, we have no reason to believe in God. But perhaps we should distinguish between a strong and a weak reading of Russell's suggestion:
S. Just as we cannot have any reason to believe that an empirically undetectable celestial teapot exists, we cannot have any reason to believe that God exists.
W. Just as we do not have any reason to believe that a celestial teapot exists, we do not have any reason to believe that God exists.
Now it seems to me that both (S) and (W) are plainly false: we have all sorts of reasons for believing that God exists. Here Alvin Plantinga sketches about two dozen theistic arguments. Atheists will not find them compelling, of course, but that is irrelevant. The issue is whether a reasoned case can be made for theism, and the answer is in the affirmative. Belief in God and in Russell's teapot are therefore not on a par since there are no empirical or theoretical reasons for believing in his teapot.
Another suggestion embedded in the Russell passage is the notion that if God existed, he would be just another physical thing in the physical universe. But of course this has nothing to do with anything maintained by any sophisticated theist. God is a purely spiritual being.
Moreover, Billy the MP, while correctly pointing out the Ad Ignorantium fallacy that Russell attacks as a typical xtian sort of pseudo-argument, doesn't quite understand all the implications of the analogy, especially the implications of the following passage:
But if I were to go on to say that, since my assertion cannot be disproved, it is intolerable presumption on the part of human reason to doubt it, I should rightly be thought to be talking nonsense.
That is the real issue, however mundane: shouldn't humans be allowed to doubt--strongly doubt-- the existence of some supposed X which cannot be observed, inferred, nor empirically proven to exist? (nor, quite arguably, proven deductively or mathematically). That is the crux of Russell's analogy: not only that "God" cannot be proven to exist, but that we are not, according to xtian tradition, even to doubt His existence given that lack of proof. The noun "teapot" is not the point. Make it "JHVH in a spaceship" (perhaps teapot-sized), and the argument still holds.
Even if we agreed that Russell's analogy was, in terms of language and imagery, incredibly rude, blasphemous, obscene (""the reduction of the Almighty to a Teapot??!! Preposterous. To the dungeon!""), that does not negate the force of the argument.
