"Fundamentalism is the triumph of Paul over Christ"

[perezoso]

Most are most likely aware of the "Paul is the corrupter of the doctrines of Jesus" type of rant, common to various long-winded skeptics: "Fundamentalism is the triumph of Paul over Christ" as Will Durant said. Yet fundamentalists, starting with Luther actually, often draw upon Paul's insistence that the sinner is justified by faith rather than works. For those few humans who want to believe in a literal reading of Scripture, the protestant emphasis on Pauline doctrine should be troubling. For instance, Christ's message in the Beatitudes (the Sermon on the Mount) is a fairly decent statement of objective or at least intersubjective ethics; the Beatitudes is the core curriculum I think of JC's project, and though Paul's and JC's teachings are not exactly contradictory, there are great differences. Note Paul's insistence on respecting authority in Romans 13; in Matthew 5 and 6, JC seems far less obedient: "ye cannot serve God and Mammon." And JC, or whoever wrote the Sermon on the Mount, certainly wins the open mike contest: his parables, imagery, metaphors are much more skillful than Pauline sunday school rhetoric. Matthew 5- 6 would have pleased Blake I think.

The note of persecution is more pronounced in JC's writing than it is in Paul--as in the prayers and blessings for the oppressed. I think Paul is the rabbinical tyrant still, though certainly with some authentic Christian forgiveness. And specifically, the Matt 7-12 passage, ie. the Golden Rule: Paul would never have said such a thing. I think that is the statement of someone who is quite aware of the tradition of Greek philosophy, or maybe it's the Deity, perhaps before He exited these space-time coordinates. It is really quite rational, not the "thou shall love thy neighbor as thyself" as Paul restates the Great Commandment. Additionally, I think JC, although upholding or fulfilling the law to some degree, is not upholding it in the same manner or degree as is Paul: JC is closer to the Law and the decalogue, but it would take me some time to establish this. Suffice it to say JC is aware of sin in thought, word, and deed, as the Anglicans say (or pretend to say) ; Paul's concerns seem more superficial. But obviously there are powerful and even poetic elements to Pauls writing: Ephesians especially.

The Reformation begins with Luther's denial of grace by works: instead the sinner is justified by faith, sort of the central Pauline message. Athough I do not know enough Koine Greek or Hebrew to say so, I tend to think Matthew is the Ur gospel; and the Sermon on the Mount not so much about "faith" but about action and virtue, and not so far from Aristotelian ethics. Or at least that's how I read it. Thus Luther's move towards faith above works ( and reason really) distances the Evangelist from the ethical message of the Beatitudes and indeed of JC .

Luther is still close to Catholicism, though. The 96 Theses are the writings of a german Catholic critiquing papist hypocrisy--not an overturning of Catholic or Aquinean laws. His attacks on simony , indulgences and so forth are interesting and still relevant. Which leads me to my central and probably boring point. The Summa is THE primary philosophical document relating to Scripture. If you accept any theological concepts then classical arguments for God--ontology, design, causality, etc.-- are still to be considered, as Kant and earlier Descartes realized.

Notwithstanding the fact that I will sound like a primitive or conservative, I think there are ample grounds for the Argument from Design, say, though relating that Intelligence to traditional scriptural views is not an easy task. Darwin himself marveled at the structure of the mammalian eye, and speculated how could such a complex and wondrous device arise ex nihilo. Indeed it might be argued that the intelligent design theorists such as Behe are the ones saving theology, not the post-modernist irrationalists who occasionaly dip into the religion business..

Yet any theological perspective must deal with the Problem of Evil. Indeed, seminary types should be working on essay topics such as "We have Greatly Underestimated The Power of Our Adversary," while looking at pics of the corpses of Vietnam, Dachau, Verdun etc. My neighbors, all good church goers, think Jesus takes the form of aircraft carriers, F-18s, cruise missiles. Gott, if he exists, must like soldiers.

[Doreen Peri]

hi peresozo...

I'm not sure he ever existed. I think it was a myth.

If you can prove to me this man called Jesus actually walked this planet, then I'll try to figure out what your post means.

Is it fiction?

There were no contemporary writings which referred to him.

You just reminded me that I forgot to post the post I wanted to post about the Problem of Evil.... or the lack of a problem.... that's the question. Thanks!

happy holydays

[stilltrucking]

..

[e_dog]

Theology

I think Voltaire's response to Leibniz is a good specific illustration of "the problem of evil," and showing that it ain't just a problem of evil but of suffering, including natural disasters: pointing to Lisbon earthquake as evidence of the ansurdity of Leibniz's claim that we inhabit the best of all possible worlds.

but the problem of evil is simply put in these abstract terms; it is not so much a refutation of the existence of god as its is a refutation of a benevolent, omniscient and omnipotent God which is after all the only God that theologians seem to pine after. let X represent unredeemed evil or gratuitous suffering. all the facts of experience show that X exists. a good God wouldn't let that happen. if God exists and is good and knows about X then He must be impotent to change it. but who wants a wimpy God? (My daddy can beat up your daddy. . .) so, if God is all-powerful and good, then he must not know about X. but a stupid God is worse than a wimpy God. so, maybe God know and can change it, but he doesn't do so. but then God is evil. but that cannot be because we all know that God is good. Gott ist gut. As Plato says the Form of the Good is really groovy. so how to solve this paradox? the easy alternative is that this "God" figure doesn't exist.

Perezoso, it surprises me to hear you touting the design rational. the argument from design, like the cosmological argument, are pseudo-explanations, like the mythic hypothesis that the world doesn't fall into the abyss because it rests upon the shell of a giant tortoise.... cosmological argument: all events must be traced back to a first cause. okay, so what caused the causer? answer: its self-causing or it needs no cause (which is the same thing), i.e. see the ontological argument. design argument: uh, just like the cosmological argument, but with prettier illustrations. problem: who designs the designer. answer: either 1) he is self-designed (does that makes sense? if so, why cannot nature be an example of self-organizing local process within chaos the origin of which we admit to be unknown rather than positing fantasied "god(s)") or 2) see ontological argument. ontological argument (boiled down to its essence states): god exists because i define him as existing. which means the same as: theology wins because i say so. this, the ultimate vindication of authority, divine and temporal.

[e_dog]

the best writers on this are Hume (Natural History of Religion), B. Russell (Why I am not a Christian), and J. L. Mackie (The Miracle of Theism).

Aristotle and Kant sorta set the terms of the debate but chicken out before accepting the empiricist conclusions. Anselm, Aquinas, Descartes are all a great exposition of how brilliant stupity can become in the right hands.

[perezoso]

I am quite aware of both Voltaire's stances (as in Candide) and Russell's against theology and the "classical arguments". I would agree that any ethical perception of God would seem to imply that He knows and allows tremendous suffering but does not do anything about it. However, that is assuming that our conceptions of justice are identical to Gods perspective of justice ( a point you and most leftists overlook) . God may not seem just, but He is still God: Jehovah does kill innocents in the Old Testament. That may make God seem synonymous with "evil" or injustice, and I agree it is a big problem, but again you simply assume that your ideas of justice, and really your understanding of His intentions, are equal to those of the Creator.

Either God is less powerful than we think ( but we might not see the truth or final plan which God plans--the Teleos), or HE seemingly does not want to lift a finger to stop World Wars and plagues. But there is a way out of this, however bitter it might be to our temporal minds. Scripture does imply the existence of supernatural realms--the spiritual rewards/heaven and perdition/hell ( and purgatory in Catholic). Perhaps those evil acts, including acts done ignorantly, which seem so prevalent---ARE punished and good acts rewarded; perhaps corrupt German officers and nazis and KBG murderers are in hell, and I think that is what traditional Catholics would say. So taking scripture as valid (which IS difficult for me) , God can still be just and omniscient , but his justice is not seen in this realm. In fact, the theologian asks the skeptic--what is the use or necessity of being good or ethical if there isn't some sense of cosmic justice, except from pragmatic grounds?

Russell dealt with the classical arguments ( and yeah I read "Why I am not"..quite a few times...) and I agree with him mostly, but his treatment was fairly superficial. And if I recall he did lend some support to the Ontological argument ( at least at some point), as did Descartes. (Though I think the Onto. of Descartes and Anselm is mistaken--existence is not an attribute, even of a conceived perfect being ) I happen to think that the Design argument is the most compelling: Modern biochemistry lends support to a somewhat modified evolutionary theory; the chances of many biological processes--the enzymatic processes of blood clotting , sight, cell transport and others-- occuring randomly are so incredibly remote that it is amazing that they exist. The notion of an Intelligent Designer may seem superficial or even fundamentalist (though also similar to Deist arguments put forth by Newton. Paley, Jefferson, etc.) , but there are quite a few decent arguments for this view asserted by Behe, a catholic chemist, and Dembski, a mathematician. (I do not agree with some of Dembksi's more fundamentalist ideas). Yet this Designer is not prima facie ethical or loving--so various theological concepts--a soul, sin, rewards, perdition. etc-- will have to justify His fondness for wars, plagues, death etc.

[STUPID BOB]

I happen to think that the Design argument is the most compelling: Modern biochemistry lends support to a somewhat modified evolutionary theory; the chances of many biological processes--the enzymatic processes of blood clotting , sight, cell transport and others-- occuring randomly are so incredibly remote that it is amazing that they exist. The notion of an Intelligent Designer may seem superficial or even fundamentalist (though also similar to Deist arguments put forth by Newton. Paley, Jefferson, etc.) , but there are quite a few decent arguments for this view asserted by Behe, a catholic chemist, and Dembski, a mathematician. (I do not agree with some of Dembksi's more fundamentalist ideas). Yet this Designer is not prima facie ethical or loving--so various theological concepts--a soul, sin, rewards, perdition. etc-- will have to justify His fondness for wars, plagues, death etc.

The Design Theory does seem comfortable to some degree. There are numerous decent arguements against it on the linked site below that do not stem from the usual sources.

The idea that life here is amazing is also based on human perceptions and experience. I think it arrogant to suggest that the universe is inept in any way.

http://www.geocities.com/wpmpan/WELCOME.html

[stilltrucking]

..

[Lightning Rod]

zoso==

I call them the Beat Attitudes. But I agree with you that Paul wore his shoes (sandals?) too tight and really fucked up the teachings of Christ. It's kind of like when the corporate franchiser MBA's got ahold of Col Sanders. They took the basic recipie and turned it into a marketing scheme and started using amphetamine fed chickens raised in six by six inch individual cells, etc. You know the whole sad story. Something that may be intrincically good and valuable gets spoiled by the process of selling it. Oh well, I like a good piece of Col Sanders chicken once in a while.

When I was the guest of the Governor of Texas I read the whole eleven volumes of Will Durant's 'The History of Civilization.'

What a fuckin' great adventure!

[e_dog]

about divine justice:

you are right, i never considered the idea that 'god works in mysterious ways!' god isn't just according to any known, respectable human concept of justice but he is just in a, like, supernatural sort of justice. what a cogent argument! i guess family-abusing fathers can, say, "well, beating one's children may not be acceptable according to your profane vision of morality and law, but it is perfectly okay and justified by my special concept of fatherly justice."

about the theology of designer genes:
how does the fact that some phenomenon is according to our limited knowledge of physical reality "improbable" justify saying that there is some "thing" (or "intelligence," like "God") that designs it. how is this possibly an explanation? it simply raises more questions than it answers, such as How probable is the existence of such a designer? again, it all comes down to who designed the designer. if you cannot answer that, then it does not seem that anything has been explained. might as well just say, well, we don't really know everything about how the eyeball (the universe, etc.) emerged. is it really better to answer the question being saying, God did it, when all this does is raise a lot of unanswerable questions about the nature and origin of this posited god-construct. i don't think Russell's essay is at all superficial, it just tells it like it is, simply, because the truth is simple in this regard: theology is nonsense and pseudo-rational. but if you want a more comprehensive view on the matter check out Mackie's book which is the best written on the subject i know of.

[perezoso]

There are some current philosophers--Eccles and Popper at the end of his life, Chalmers as well--who feel there are grounds for immaterial views of mind, that mind is not identical with brain processes. You obviously are not aware of this, since your reading seems to be the standard hackneyed leftism of Marx and Freud. IF mind is in any sense immaterial--a traditional idealist view, whether Platonic or Kantian/hegelian or otherwise--then theological views could obviously be plausible.

If you walk into a casino and win every time when the odds are 1 out of a million, then you might begin to think the game is rigged or planned. And the chance of certain organic molecular combinations necessary for human life arising randomly is far less than 1 out of a million. Thats sort of a simple version of Dembskis claim

. . . To be honest, I think eliminating injustice, solving social and economic problem are more important than any mysticism; nonetheless, there are some interesting ideas floating around regarding immaterialism.....

Additionally, a notion of cosmic justice--also present in eastern religions-- is a bit more than "God works in mysterious ways." You missed the point; indeed you oversimplified the point. Id' say Dante's Malebolge --full of the corrupt and lying politicians and tyrants of the centuries --is a bit beyond some undergraduate flyweight skepticism, as TS Eliot knew.

[e_dog]

"Get in the Ring" G'N'R

perezoso, i do enjoy debating with you but you should really cut back on the ad hominem arguments and presumptuous statements about your opponents (or perhaps you should continue b/c...) it may get you into trouble.

you wanna go round for round on the concept of mind, i can do that, but that might require arguments and criticism rather than references to others work without explaining your understanding of them. I actually have read quite a bit of analytic philosophy of mind, and frankly "immaterialism" is, like, so 18th century. read up on "supervenience" theory and then get back to me and we'll talk about the mental.

anyway, the logic that supports the argument that God might exist because the mind is immaterial must be way beyond my ken.

my characteriziation of your "divine justice" argument as amounting to "god works in mysterious ways" is indeed a simplification, or a reduction, and as i said before the truth is very simple in this area: theology is nonsense if treated as a science, it is very interesting i guess if treated as a mythology or literature. you said, does Hamlet exists? if you are only claiming that God exists in the sense in which a fictional character can be said to "exist" then i have no objections to the existence of god. why spoil a child's Xmas by telling him Santa is just daddy? (and, no, i won't put down Freud b/c, well, he is just so damn good (and evil).)

[perezoso]

Eccles and Popper and non-locality aspects of quantum physics 18th century? I think not. Freud is 18th century (if not 10th) as is Marx's hobbesian materialism (which I respect nonetheless). If you are comfortable with analytical philosophy then I imagine you should have read some of Popper's attacks on induction: and as I said Russell's system--at least until after 1920 or so--was not some simple materialism or physicalism, and had very platonic elements to it: he held to a tradional belief in universals, which were not mental or physical: universals "subsisted", ,in what? a noesis? God? Im not sure, but it was certainly metaphysical. Quine himself asserted that physicalism was a convenient ans useful hypothesis, but that idealist or platonic explanations were in many cases ( ie. logical and mathematical) nearly if not more plausible.....

so you are ducking the issue: are you denying any immaterial states of mind or "qualia" as the cog. sci. dudes say? great. Let's hear it--I know you always shy away from any real claims. So the "unconscious": is that also biological in nature without any metaphysical entities?

[e_dog]

i neither affirm nor deny "immaterial" entities because i am not sure how you use the term "immaterial" or "material." for that matter.

but first, quine. but first, russell. russell wrote something about everything from many differnet phil. perspectives. russell on universals -- not his finest hour. universals don't exist, they subsist. interesting. santa claus doesn't exist, he Xists. the devil doesn't exist, it exorcists. the void doesn't exist, it ur-sists. etc. etc. inventing a word to label the solution to a mystery is not solving the mystery (i.e. "God" is the necessary being or first mover; "Jack th Ripper" is the killer, therefore the case is solved b/c we have a nickname to blame).

now, quine. quine was a physicalistic, through and through, though also a pragmatist. he is okay with the positing of abstract or logical or even mythical entities if it will serve the best (most useful) explanatory theory of experience, etc. this is not "immaterialism" except in a weak sense. quine no more supports the positing of a cartesian mind or god substance than the fact that "or" doesn't have an object to which it corresponds would support the theory of the immaterialism of the "or." rather, like logical operators, certain terms in quine's view can serve the role of theoretical constructs. ultimately it comes down to convenience of explanation. this is not a comfortable position for any theologian, because it is not clear that God does any theoretical-explanatory work on an abductive conception of epistemology. which brings me to

Popper. critique of induction. falsifiability and all that. yea. don't see what this has to do with the metaphysical questions as opposed to pure method or epistemology. enlighten me.

qualia. i'm not convinced that all participants in this debate use the term in the same way. some want to suggest that qualia are "feelings" or some that they are "states" or "properties" or "entities." know the problem, don't like the term. i do not deny "immaterial states of mind" as you say, because i don't know what that means. if you mean a state of mind that exists independently of matter, then i assert there is no such thing. how could there be proof or even any trace of such a thing. seems inconceivable. i have little faith in "cog. sci." or any human science for that matter, but it is clear from everyday experience and comon sense, as well as neurobiology, etc. that what we call mental states are in some sense dependent on matter, or those physical systems we call nervous systems (or if you wanna be post-humanist, possibly some computers, etc.) whatever the exact natuer of this dependency relation is (a topic of much debate, largely unsettled) thye dualistic ontology of say Descartes is bogus as is a simpleminded equation mind = brain which when made is an instance of people using terms from two distinct discoursive realms in a convoluted manner. best to say that the mind is realized by the brain (and its relation to surroundings) but then again that is just a short-hand for a complex process of interaction amongst bits of physical reality (matter-energy, space-time, whatever the fuck it is).

so, my position is: does anything exist independent of the physical world? No. Does this mean that everything can be identified with a discrete material object? No. IS this materialism? in an extended sense of materialism, i think it is; it carries on that legacy; don't like the term physicalism cause it connotes scientist-sucking hero worship, to some.

Unconscious. The term "unconscious," like most psych. terms (like mental) is best used as an adjective rather than a substantive noun. I.e. an unconscious desire, an unconscious memory, etc. Freudian theory does not require that there be some thing or substance the unconscious which is locate just below and to the right of the ego (or was it the left?). Freud thought that his theory was consistent with naturalistic science after Darwin; the fact that we cannot yet translate all Freudian concpets into biological or physiological concpets stems from two major barriers: first, psychoanalysis is a social psychology in the sense that it relies on social relations to explain certain phenomena so it would require not just a super-duper anatomy of the brain but averitable sociological determinism to reduce psychoanalysis to the level of physicalist description; second, psychoanalysis is an interpretive practice and as such it is subject to the very difficult, perhaps impossible, task of translating concepts that don't name discrete objects into physicalist descriptions. (you earlier spoke about the nature of "justice" justice does not name a material object but rathr is a term used in a practice, in relation to the material world, yes, but not in any simple way; so, too, with concepts like sublimation (maybe), guilt, family.)

[GordonWilson]

it's all a load of dick, mr.lennon.